Solutions in the Convention on the Law
of the Sea to the Problem of Overfishing
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The concept offreedom of the seas is neither absolute nor static: it
embodies the balance of jurisdictionalfunctions among States
which at any time best serve the community of nations, and its
content is subject to constant modification as that community adjusts itself to the solution of new problems. Where it is generally
thought acceptable that States should insist upon certain conduct
on or over the high seas, the abstractfreedom of the sea will not
stand in the way.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States and the Soviet Union have become increasingly
concerned with the uncontrolled fishing by Japan, South Korea, the
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People's Republic of China, Poland, and possibly Taiwan and North
Korea, in the Central Bering Sea.2 The Central Bering Sea is an
approximately 5,000 square mile area in the Bering Sea surrounded
by the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of the United States and
the Soviet Union.3 The Central Bering Sea has become the focus of
2. See S. Res. 396, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 134, CONG. REc. 2,609 (1988); U.S.,
Soviets Fight High-Seas Harvests: Nations Sign "Monumental" Deal to End Salmon
Fishing Outside 200-mile Zone, Anchorage Daily News, Feb. 11, 1989, at Dl, col. 1
[hereinafter U.S., Soviets Fight High-Seas Harvests]; Joint Press Statement, Washington, D.C., made after United States and Soviet delegations met to discuss fisheries issues
of mutual concern (Feb. 10, 1989) (available at the offices of the San Diego Law Review) [hereinafter Joint Press Statement, Feb. 10, 1989]; Joint Press Statement, Moscow, made after United States and Soviet delegations met to discuss fisheries issues of
mutual concern (Oct. 20, 1988) (available at the offices of the San Diego Law Review)
[hereinafter Joint Press Statement, Oct. 20, 1988]; Reeling in a Fishing Free-For-All,
U.P.I., Anchorage, Alaska, July 25, 1988, at 1 (available at the offices of the San Diego
Law Review); Joint Press Statement, Washington, D.C., made after United States and
Soviet delegations met to discuss fisheries issues of mutual concern (Apr. 22, 1988)
(available at the offices of the San Diego Law Review) [hereinafter Joint Press Statement, Apr. 22, 1988]; Senate Adopts Resolution Callingfor Ban on ForeignFishing in
Donut Region, MARINE FISH MGMT., Mar. 1988, at 1-2 [hereinafter Resolution]; Joint
Press Statement, Moscow, made after United States and Soviet delegations met to discuss fisheries issues of mutual concern (Jan. 29, 1988) (available at the offices of the San
Diego Law Review) [hereinafter Joint Press Statement, Jan. 29, 1988].
The Central Bering Sea has also been referred to as "the Doughnut Hole," or "Hole in

the Doughnut." See S.Res. 396, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. 2,618 (1988);

Reeling in a Fishing Free-For-All, supra, at 1.
3. The United States has an "exclusive economic zone," while the Soviet Union
has an "economic zone." For convenience, this article will refer to these collectively as
"EEZs." The "exclusive economic zone" and the "economic zone" refer to the area recognized as the "exclusive economic zone" in the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea, done Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122, reprinted in 21 I.L.M.
1261 (1982) [hereinafter Convention or CLOS]. The CLOS was signed on December 10,
1982 by 119 states, including the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, Poland,
and North Korea. The United States, Japan, and South Korea did not sign the CLOS at
that time, but did participate and sign the CLOS Final Act. Taiwan did not participate.
UNITED NATIONS, THE LAW OF THE SEA, OFFICIAL TEXT OF THE UNITED NATIONS CON-

VENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA

190 (1983). Subsequently, 40 additional states have

signed the CLOS, including Japan and South Korea. In addition, 34 of the necessary 60
states have ratified the CLOS; the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, Poland,
North Korea, Japan, and South Korea have not yet ratified it. See CLOS, supra, at art.
308.
Though the United States has not signed the CLOS because it objects to the provisions
concerning deep seabed mining, the United States considers the CLOS to contain provisions with respect to traditional uses of the oceans that generally confirm existing maritime law and practice, and that fairly balance the interests of all states. Hence, it has
accepted and pledged to act in accordance with these provisions as customary international law. The United States has specifically recognized the rights of navigation and
overflight and the rights of states in the waters off their coasts so long as the rights of the
United States are reciprocally recognized. United States Ocean Policy, 19 WEEKLY
CONIP. PRES. Doc. 383 (Mar. 10, 1983). Others also consider the CLOS in large part to
represent customary international law. See Belsky, Management of Large Marine Ecosystems: Developing a New Rule of Customary International Law, 22 SAN DIEGO L.
REv, 733, 748 (1985); Copes, The Impact of UNCLOS III on Management of the
World's Fisheries, 5(3) MARINE POL'Y 217, 218 (1981) [hereinafter Copes, UNCLOS
III]; Knauss, CreepingJurisdiction and InternationalLaw, 15(2) OCEAN DEV. & INT'L
L. 209, 211 (1985).
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concern because escalating fish harvests there in the past decade
may be having a deleterious effect on fisheries in the EEZs of the
United States and the Soviet Union.
Large-scale fishing in the Central Bering Sea is a relatively recent
phenomenon. In 1980, 15,000 metric tons of pollock were reportedly
harvested. By 1986, the harvest reached one million metric tons.
Fishing has increased, in part, as a result of the phase-out of foreign
fishing in the EEZs of the United States and the Soviet Union. 5 The
phase-outs result from domestic fishermen becoming capable of harvesting the optimum yield.0 Fishermen displaced by these phase-outs
The CLOS recognizes the exclusive economic zone to be an area beyond and adjacent
to the territorial sea, and can extend up to 200 nautical miles from the baseline from
which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. CLOS, supra, at arts. 55, 57. The
territorial sea is a belt of sea, adjacent to the coastal state's land territory and internal
waters, up to 12 nautical miles from the baseline. Id. at art. 3. The coastal state's sovereign power extends over the territorial sea, to the air space over the territorial sea, and to
the seabed and subsoil below it. Id. at arts. 2, 3. The baseline from which both the EEZ
and the territorial sea are measured is generally "the low water line along the coast as
marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal state." Id. at art. 5.
Within the exclusive economic zone, the coastal state has, inter alia, sovereign rights
for the purpose of exploring, exploiting, conserving, and managing the living natural resources of the waters superjacent to the seabed, and the living natural resources of the
seabed and its subsoil. Id. at arts. 56, 61, 62. Both the United States and the Soviet
Union have exclusive economic zones of 200 nautical miles. See Proclamation No. 5030,
48 Fed. Reg. 10,605 (1983); Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act of
1976 §§ 3(6), 101, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1802(6), 1811 (1988) [hereinafter MFCMA].
Under the CLOS, the parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic
zone, the territorial sea, internal waters, or archipelagic waters, are considered the high
seas. CLOS, supra, at art. 86.
4. See S. Res. 396, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. 2,618 (1988); Reeling in a Fishing Free-For-All, supra note 2, at 1.
5. See Tons of U.S. Fish? A Delivery to Japan's Black Market, The Seattle
Times, Aug. 18, 1988, at Al, col. 1; Illegal Japanese Fishing is Reported in Coastal
Waters, The Seattle Post Intelligencer, Aug. 18, 1988, at C8, col. 1; FAJ Position to be
Charged, Mainichi Shimbun, Aug. 17, 1988, at 22.
6. The optimum yield is the amount of fish that has been determined to provide
the greatest overall benefit to the nation and that prevents overfishing. This amount is
determined by ascertaining the maximum sustainable yield, and modifying it by any relevant economic, social, or ecological factors. MFCMA § 3(18), 16 U.S.C. § 1802 (18)
(1988); 50 C.F.R. § 602.11 & app. A to subpt. B (Standard 1- Optimum Yield) (1988).
The maximum sustainable yield is the level at which a fish stock can be fished where the
loss to the stock from fishing and natural mortality is balanced by the increase from
reproduction. At this level, and under relatively stable environmental circumstances, the
same quantity of fish can be caught year after year without the total size of the stock
being adversely affected. See 50 C.F.R. § 602.11(c) & app. A to subpt. B (Standard IMaximum Sustainable Yield) (1988); R. CHURCHILL & A. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE
SEA 199 (1983). The CLOS recognizes that the coastal state has a duty to promote the
objective of optimum utilization of the living resources in the EEZ. The CLOS notes that
the coastal state must determine the allowable catch of the living resources in its EEZ,
and, taking into account the best scientific evidence available to it, ensure through proper

often merely moved their fishing operations into the Central Bering
Sea.7 Thus, domestic fishing has increased to optimum yield levels,
but fishing by other states8 has not decreased-and may be increasing-in the Bering Sea as a whole.
The fish harvested are largely pollock, but may also include
salmon and other stocks, such as catadromous 9 and sedentary'0 species. Because there is insufficient oceanographic, biological, and harvest level data, scientists do not know if the pollock and other stocks

are currently overharvested. The large harvests cause scientists to

fear that overharvesting is occurring, however."

conservation and management measures that the living resources are not endangered by
overexploitation. The CLOS indicates that the measures must "also be designed to maintain or restore populations of harvested species at levels that can produce the maximum
sustainable yield, as qualified by relevant environmental and economic factors, taking
into account fishing patterns, the interdependence of stocks and any generally recommended international minimum standards. . . ." CLOS, supra note 3, at art. 61. The
CLOS also recognizes the coastal state's duty to determine its capacity to harvest the
living resources of the EEZ. The CLOS indicates that, where the coastal state does not
have the capacity to harvest the entire allowable catch, it must, pursuant to its conditions, laws, and regulations, give other states access to the surplus of the allowable catch.
Id. at art. 62.
7. Some of these fishermen continue to fish in the United States' EEZ illegally,
under the pretense of fishing in the Central Bering Sea. See S. Res. 396, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess., 134 CONG. REc. 2,609 (1988); Tons of U.S. Fish? A Delivery to Japan's Black
Market, supra note 5, at Al, col. 1; Illegal Japanese Fishing is Reported in Coastal
Waters, supra note 5, at C8, col. 1; Poaching Should Cease, Say Most Fish Dealers-But Poached Fish Cheaper, Mainichi Daily News, Aug. 18, 1988, at 14, col. 1;
Fish Poaching in U.S. Waters Uncovered, Mainichi Daily News, Aug. 18, 1988, at 1, col.
1 (reprinted from Mainichi Shimbun, Aug. 17, 1988, at 1, 23); FAJ Position to Be
Charged, Mainichi Shimbun, supra note 5, at 22; Resolution, supra note 2, at 1; Fishing
Violations Claimed: Trawlers Group Wants Crackdown, Anchorage Daily News, Jan.
21, 1988, at Al, col. 4; A "Massive" Invasion of Foreign Fishermen? Seattleites Cite
Illegal Activity in Bering Sea, Seattle Post Intelligencer, Jan. 17, 1988, at Al, col. 4.
While this is a serious issue that must be resolved in order to prevent overfishing in the
Bering Sea as a whole, this is a domestic problem of the United States-a matter of
enforcing United States law, requiring domestic action, not a matter of international law.
Thus, it is a subject that is beyond the scope of this paper. It should be noted, however,
that the CLOS recognizes that the coastal state has sovereign rights for the purposes of
conserving and managing living resources within its EEZ. In the exercise of those rights,
the coastal state may take measures necessary to ensure compliance with laws and regulations that are adopted in conformity with the CLOS. CLOS, supra note 3, at arts.
56(1), 62(4), 73(1). Thus, the United States clearly has authority recognized by the
CLOS to prevent illegal fishing within its EEZ.
8. In this article, the terms "state" and "states" are used in the international
sense, not in the domestic sense.
9. Catadromous species are species that live their lives in fresh water and then
migrate to the ocean to spawn.
10. Sedentary species are species which, at the harvestable stage, either are immobile on or under the seabed, or are unable to move except while in constant physical
contact with the seabed or subsoil.

11. Scientists from the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, China, South Korea, Poland, and Canada met in Sitka, Alaska on July 19-21, 1988, to discuss the status

of the pollock stocks in the Central Bering Sea. While the scientists agreed that there
was insufficient scientific information available about the pollock stocks and were not
able to ascertain how many fish are there, they estimated that 1 million metric tons of
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Available oceanographic and biological data lead scientists to believe that the pollock stocks in the Bering Sea are one complex, and
should be treated as such for management and conservation purposes. 12 If the pollock stocks are one complex stock as scientists theorize, full utilization by domestic fishermen of stocks within their respective EEZs likely results in the availability of a relatively limited
amount of fish for harvest in the Central Bering Sea without exceeding the maximum sustainable yield 13 of the Bering Sea as a whole.
Current levels of fishing in the Central Bering Sea may result in

overfishing of the stocks throughout the Bering Sea.' Continued
overfishing will result in depletion of the stocks, including the resources of the coastal states.1 Currently, fishermen of the coastal
fish are now being caught there annually. The scientists feared that overfishing could be
occurring. They agreed that the current research effort must be expanded and indicated
that a coordinated international program is desirable. See Reeling in a FishingFree-ForAll, supra note 2, at 1; International Scientific Symposium on Bering Sea Fisheries,
Press Release (July 21, 1988) (available at the offices of the San Diego Law Review); see
also Joint Press Statement, Oct. 20, 1988, supra note 2. There has been some evidence of
overfishing of Alaska pollock and yellowtail flounder in the Bering Sea as the sizes of the
catch have decreased from their peaks in 1972 and 1961, respectively. See Tanaka, Japa-

nese Fisheries and Fishery Resources in the Northwest Pacific, 6

OCEAN DEV. & INT'L

L. 163, 164 (1979).
Duties concerning cooperation and coordination of scientific research by states fishing
on the high seas are recognized in the CLOS. "Available scientific information, catch
and fishing effort statistics, and other data relevant to the conservation of fish stocks shall
be contributed and exchanged on a regular basis through competent international organizations. . .where appropriate and with participation by all States concerned." CLOS,
supra note 3, at art. 119(2). States-and competent international organizations have a
duty to promote and facilitate the development and conduct of marine scientific research.
Id. at arts. 239, 242. The CLOS also recognizes that states and competent international
organizations must publish and disseminate, through appropriate channels, information
on proposed research programs as well as knowledge resulting from marine scientific
research. Id. at art. 244(1). In addition, the CLOS recognizes that states, individually
and in cooperation with other states and competent international organizations, have a
duty to actively promote the flow of scientific data and information. Id. at art. 244(2).
Thus, if any state whose fishermen fished in the Central Bering Sea were to refuse to
cooperate with other states in doing scientific research concerning the pollock stocks in
the Central Bering Sea and sharing the resulting data and information, that state would
be in violation of the CLOS.
12. See S. Res. 396, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. 2,618 (1988); Efforts by U.S. Senate to Cope with Bering Sea Straddling Fish Stocks, OCEAN SCI.
NEWS, Apr. 15, 1988, at 1 [hereinafter Efforts].
13. For a discussion of maximum sustainable yield, see supra note 6.
14. Where a fish stock is being fished at a level above its maximum sustainable
yield, the size of the stock and the amount of the catch will decrease. This is considered
overfishing. 50 C.F.R. 602.11 (d) & app. A to subpt. B (Standard 1- Overfishing) (1988);
R. CHURCHILL & A. LOWE, supra note 6, at 199.
15. See S. Res. 396, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REc. 2,618 (1988); U.S.,
Soviets Fight High-Seas Harvests, supra note 2, at D1, col. 1; Joint Press Statement,

Feb. 10, 1989, supra note 2; Reeling in a Fishing Free-For-All, supra note 2, at 1;

states are forgoing fishing opportunities by abiding by domestic conservation regimes."6 Thus, overfishing in the Central Bering Sea
would penalize coastal states' domestic fishermen and undermine the
conservation regimes.
Most, if not all, of the salmon in the Central Bering Sea originate
from the internal waters of the United States and the Soviet Union.
Both the United States and the Soviet Union claim jurisdiction over
the salmon that originate in their internal waters, whether the
salmon are found in their own EEZs or in the high seas.' 7 Because
salmon stocks are anadromous (that is, they hatch in freshwater rivers and streams, migrate to the ocean, and then return to the freshwater river or stream of their origin to spawn and die), the state of
origin has a substantial interest in harvesting these fish. The state of

origin's investments in the salmon and other anadromous stocks are
not matched by any other state fishing those stocks on the high seas.
The state of origin protects the stocks by keeping pollution to a minimum in its rivers and lakes and by removing obstructions to the
salmon runs created by landslides, dams, and other obstacles. The
state of origin must forgo other competing uses for the rivers on
which the salmon run, including power generation, flood control, industrial waste disposal, irrigation, and navigation. The state of origin
also invests in the stock by enhancing the stock with spawning channels and hatcheries, and by improving the stock's habitat.' 8 Where
nonorigin states harvest anadromous stocks on the high seas, this investment is lost.1 9
In the Central Bering Sea, as in all areas of the high seas, these
and other resources have been considered the property of no one, and
therefore susceptible to harvest by anyone. Hence, each state harEfforts, supra note 12, at 1.
16. See 50 C.F.R. § 675.20(a)(2) (1988); Fishery Management Plan for the
Groundfish Fishery of the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Area, as amended.
17. See MFCMA § 101, 16 U.S.C. § 1811 (1988). The United States claims
"exclusive management authority over. . .[a]ll anadromous species throughout the migratory range of each such species beyond the exclusive economic zone; except that that
management authority shall not extend to such species during the time they are found
within any foreign nation's territorial sea or exclusive economic zone (or the equivalent),
to the extent that that sea or zone is recognized by the United States." Id.; see also I D.
O'CONNELL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 569 (1982). The United States has
also prohibited foreign fishing vessels from harvesting anadromous species without a valid
permit. See 50 C.F.R. § 611.7(b)(2) (1988).
18. See Copes, UNCLOS III, supra note 3, at 219; Copes, The Law of the Sea
and Management of Anadromous Fish Stocks, 4(3) OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 233, 24344 (1977) [hereinafter Copes, Anadromous Fish Stocks]; Kindt, The Law of the Sea:
Anadromous and CatadromousFish Stocks, Sedentary Species, and the Highly Migratory Species, 11 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COMM. 9, 11-13 (1984); Belsky, supra note 3,

at 756 n.l 12; see also infra Section 4.
19. For a history of the conflict over salmon in the Bering Sea, see Sathre,
Salmon Interception on the High Seas: A Continuing Controversy Between the United
States and Japan, 16 ENVTL. L. 731 (1986).
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vests as much as it can, knowing that other states will harvest the
resource if it does not. There is no incentive for a state to limit the
harvest for conservation purposes. The result is overfishing. It may
even mean total destruction of the resource. This "tragedy of the
commons" occurs because no one state has the authority to impose
limits for conservation purposes, because states have not been compelled by an international authority to limit their harvest, and because states have rarely cooperated with each other to limit
harvests.2
The tragedy of the commons need not occur in the Central Bering
Sea, or anywhere else, however. It can be avoided with cooperation
between states. The United States and the Soviet Union are interested in such a cooperative effort and have formed a bilateral working group on this issue. They have agreed to coordinate their actions
in exercise of their rights and duties under international law to conserve and manage the living marine resources in the Bering Sea.21
The two states are considering devising a conservation regime for the
stocks of the Central Bering Sea on a bilateral basis or on a multilateral basis with other fishing states.22
The United States Congress has suggested that a moratorium on
fishing in the Central Bering Sea be called until the strength of the
pollock stocks is ascertained to ensure that fishing in the Central
Bering Sea does not result in the collapse of the stocks there.2 3 While
no moratorium has been called for yet, the United States and the
Soviet Union have jointly called upon states fishing in the Central
Bering Sea to comply with their obligations under international law
to conserve these threatened resources by implementing conservation
measures immediately and ceasing unregulated fisheries. In addition,
the Soviet Union has recently presented the United States with a
20. See R. CHURCHILL & A. LOWE, supra note 6, at 203; Belsky, supra note 3, at
734-35, 750; Kindt, supra note 18, at 11-12; Copes, UNCLOS III, supra note 3, at 21920; Copes, Anadromous Fish Stocks, supra note 18, at 233-34.
21. See Agreement on Mutual Fisheries Relations, May 31, 1988, United StatesSoviet Union, art. XI; Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States and
the Soviet Union (on harvest of anadromous species on the high seas) 1 (Feb. 9 1989);
U.S., Soviets Fight High-Seas Harvests, supra note 2, at DI, col. 1; Joint Press Statement, Feb. 10, 1989, supra note 2; Joint Press Statement, Oct. 20, 1988, supra note 2;
Joint Press Statement, Apr. 22, 1988, supra note 2; Resolution, supra note 2, at 1-4;
Joint Press Statement, Jan. 29, 1988, supra note 2.
22. See S. Res. 396, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. 2,617 (1988); Joint
Press Statement, Feb. 10, 1989, supra note 2; Reeling in a FishingFree-For-All,supra
note 2, at 1; Efforts, supra note 12, at 1, 2; Resolution, supra note 2, at 1.
23. See S. Res. 396, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REc. 2,618-22 (1988).

proposal to regulate fishing in the Central Bering Sea.24 The United
States and the Soviet Union have also agreed to cooperate to prevent
harvest of their anadromous fish beyond their EEZs by nationals of
other states, finding high seas harvests to be wasteful and
irrational.25
This article analyzes the justification, under the Convention on the
Law of the Sea (Convention or CLOS), for various types of fishery
management control over the Central Bering Sea and the interrelationship of the freedoms, rights, duties, and interests recognized in
the Convention. A number of theories are advanced to support various types of control under the Convention. One theory holds that
multilateral control over all species in the Central Bering Sea is
compelled under CLOS Articles 116(c) through 120, which concern
conservation of living resources on the high seas. Under these articles, if cooperation is not forthcoming from all states, control by cooperating states is justified. 26 A second theory finds that multilateral
control over straddling and other associated stocks in the Central

Bering Sea is compelled under CLOS Articles 56, 61, 63(2), 87, and
116(b).27 A third theory justifies unilateral or bilateral control, with
some limitations, over the anadromous stocks in the Central Bering
Sea that originate from the United States and the Soviet Union,
under CLOS Article 66 in conjunction with CLOS Articles 87 and
116(b) .2 8 The fourth theory justifies unilateral or bilateral control
over the catadromous species in the Central Bering Sea that spend
the greater part of their life cycles within the EEZs of the United
States and the Soviet Union, if there are any such species, under
CLOS Article 67 in conjunction with CLOS Articles 87 and
116(b) .29 A fifth theory holds that unilateral or bilateral control over
the sedentary species of the continental shelf under the Bering Sea is
justified under CLOS Articles 76 and 77 in conjunction with CLOS
Articles 87 and 116(b).30 The sixth theory holds that multilateral
control of all species in the Central Bering Sea is compelled under
CLOS Article 123 in conjunction with Articles 87 and 116(b), on
the basis that the Central Bering Sea is a semi-enclosed sea. Under
24. See U.S., Soviets Fight High-Seas Harvests, supra note 2, at DI, col. 1; Joint
Press Statement, Feb. 10, 1989, supra note 2; Joint Press Statement, Oct. 20, 1988,
supra note 2.
25. See Agreement on Mutual Fisheries Relations, supra note 21, at art. VII;
Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States and the Soviet Union (on
harvest of anadromous species on the high seas), supra note 21; see also U.S., Soviets
Fight High-Seas Harvests, supra note 2 at DI, col. 1; Joint Press Statement, Feb. 10,
1989, supra note 2.
26. See infra text Section II.
27. See infra text Section III.
28. See infra text Section IV.
29. See infra text Section V.
30. See infra text Section VI.
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Article 123, if cooperation is not forthcoming by all nonlittoral fishing states, control by littoral states, together with all cooperating
nonlittoral fishing states, is justified."'
After evaluating the various theories, this paper considers the dispute resolution mechanisms available under the Convention, once the
Convention enters into force, as well as other methods of enforcement.32 Then, this paper considers the alternative of acting outside
the scope of the powers recognized by the Convention, and the dangers of "creeping jurisdiction" and undermining of the Convention.33
Finally, states' freedoms, rights, duties, and interests, recognized
under the various CLOS articles and theories, are summarized.34
This paper does not attempt to advocate use of any one theory.
Rather, it presents all the CLOS articles and theories that possibly
could be relied upon.
The Convention is not yet in force 5 and, therefore, is not yet enforceable as a treaty. Even once the Convention enters into force, by
its own terms, it will not be binding on nonsignatory states as a
treaty.36 Nevertheless, the Convention can still provide a basis for
legal action by and against any state before it enters into force, and
can provide a basis for legal action by and against nonsignatories
after it enters into force, if it is treated as customary international
law. Many states view parts of the Convention, including the provisions relating to fisheries and enclosed and semi-enclosed seas, as
codifying customary international law. 37 As such, all states are subject to the requirements of these provisions, and any state can demand any other state to comply with them.

31. See infra text Section VII.
32. See infra text Section VIII. The Convention is not yet in force, and by its
terms is not binding on nonsignatory states. See CLOS, supra note 3, at art. 308(1),

annex VI; see also supra note 3. However, many states view the Convention as codifying
customary international law. Thus, the Convention can provide a basis for legal action by
any state before it enters into force and by nonparties after it enters into force. See supra
note 3.
33. See infra text Section IX.

34. See infra text Section X.
35. The Convention has not yet been ratified by the necessary 60 states. It will
not be in force until 12 months after the sixtieth state has ratified or acceded to it. See
supra note 3.
36. See CLOS, supra note 3, at arts. 20(2), 21, 308(1), Annex VI; see also supra
note 3.
37. See supra note 3.

II.

THE CONSERVATION ON THE HIGH SEAS THEORY

Under the conservation on the high seas theory, the Convention
recognizes all states' interests in the stocks of the high seas. It limits
the freedom to fish in the high seas, and recognizes that states have
duties to independently and jointly devise conservation measures for
living resources of the high seas.
The Convention recognizes that states' freedom to fish on the high
seas is subject to the duty to conserve living resources on the high
seas. a8 States have a duty to devise and enforce regulations for their
own nationals to conserve these resources. 39 States must cooperate

with each other in conserving and managing the living resources of
the high seas, particularly when the nationals of two or more states
exploit the same resources or exploit resources in the same area.4 0
This duty requires cooperation with other states in enforcing their
own regulations against their own nationals, and in devising and enforcing conservation measures on a cooperative basis. 4 This cooperation between states is to be done in regional or subregional organizations, as appropriate.42
CLOS Article 11943 requires that the conservation measures de-

38. CLOS, supra note 3, at art. 116(c). Article 116 states: "All States have the
right for their nationals to engage in fishing on the high seas subject to. . .(c) the provisions of this section." "[T]his section" refers to Section 2, entitled "Conservation and
Management of the Living Resources of the High Seas," which includes CLOS Articles
116 through 120. See also CLOS, supra note 3, at art. 87. Article 87 states:
Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by this
Convention and by other rules of international law. It comprises... (e) freedom of fishing, subject to the conditions laid down in section 2 ....
These
freedoms shall be exercised by all States with due regard for the interests of
other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas....
Id. at art. 87. Thus, states could rely upon Article 87 as well as Article 116(c) in demanding that fishing states comply with CLOS Articles 117 through 120. See infra text
Section III. The CLOS also orders states to fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed
under the CLOS, and to exercise the rights, jurisdiction, and freedoms recognized in the
CLOS in a manner that would not constitute an abuse of right. CLOS, supra note 3, at
art. 300; see also R. CHURCHILL & A. LowE, supra note 6, at 146-47, 208-09.
39. CLOS, supra note 3, at art. 117. Article 117 indicates: "All States have the
duty to take, or to co-operate with other States in taking, such measures for their respective nationals as may be necessary for the conservation of the living resources of the high
seas."
40. Id. at art. 118. Article 118 states:
States shall co-operate with each other in the conservation and management of
living resources in the areas of the high seas. States whose nationals exploit
identical living resources, or different living resources in the same area, shall

enter into negotiations with a view to taking the necessary measures for the
conservation of the living resources concerned. They shall, as appropriate, co-

operate to establish subregional or regional fisheries organizations to this end.
41. Id. at arts. 117, 118.
42. Id. at art. 118.
43. Article 119 provides:
1. In determining the allowable catch and establishing other conservation measures for the living resources of the high seas, States shall:
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vised be designed to maintain or restore populations of harvested
species at maximum sustainable yield levels, as appropriately modified by environmental and economic factors, including the special requirements of developing states. The measures must also take into
account fishing patterns, the interdependence of stocks, and any gen-

erally recommended international minimum standards.44 The effects
on species associated with, or dependent upon, harvested species

must also be taken into account, and measures must be geared toward maintaining or restoring populations of these species. 45 Neither
the conservation measures nor their implementation may discriminate against any state.46
In determining the allowable catch and establishing other conser-

vation measures for the living resources of the high seas, states must

rely upon the best scientific evidence available. 47 States have a duty
to exchange scientific data through international organizations for

the purpose of conserving and managing high seas living resources.
These organizations may be regional,
subregional, or global, but all
48
states concerned must participate.

States also have a duty to cooperate with each other to conserve
marine mammals. They also must work through international organizations for the conservation, management, and study of
(a) take measures which are designed, on the best scientific evidence available to the States concerned, to maintain or restore populations of harvested
species at levels which can produce the maximum sustainable yield, as qualified
by relevant environmental and economic factors, including the special requirements of developing States, and taking into account fishing patterns, the interdependence of stocks and any generally recommended international minimum
standards, whether subregional, regional, or global;
(b) take into consideration the effects on species associated with or dependent upon harvested species with a view to maintaining or restoring populations
of such associated or dependent species above levels at which their reproduction may become seriously threatened.
2. Available scientific information, catch and fishing effort statistics, and other
data relevant to the conservation of fish stocks shall be contributed and exchanged on a regular basis through competent international organizations,
whether subregional, regional or global, where appropriate and with participation by all States concerned.
3. States concerned shall ensure that conservation measures and their implementation do not discriminate in form or in fact against the fishermen of any
State.
Id. at art. 119.
44. Id. at art. 119(1)(a).
45. Id. at art. 119(1)(b).
46. Id. at art. 119(3).
47. Id. at art. 119(1)(a).
48. Id. at art. 119(2); see supra note 11.

cetaceans.49
Articles 116(c) through 120 recognize that states must cooperate
in devising conservation regimes for stocks in the high seas. States
need not refrain from acting if some states refuse to cooperate, however. The Convention presumes that states will cooperate if they are
interested. Further, a state's failure to cooperate constitutes a violation of its duty under the Convention. Thus, states cooperating to
conserve high seas stocks may demand that other states cooperate
and make good faith efforts to develop an effective conservation regime. If that fails, cooperating states may act together, without the
noncooperating states, to devise a conservation scheme, so long as
the scheme complies with the guidelines provided in CLOS Article
119.50
Thus, CLOS Articles 116(c) through 120 recognize all states'
freedoms, interests, and duties concerning stocks in the high seas.
These articles also recognize that the freedom to fish on the high
seas is curtailed by conservation needs, and that states have duties to
independently and jointly devise conservation measures for the living
resources of the high seas. States can rely upon these articles to demand that other states cooperate and limit their fishing for this
purpose.
PracticalApplication
Relying on the Convention as treaty (once it is in force) or as
customary international law, under the conservation on the high seas
theory, the United States and the Soviet Union must attempt to
work with other states fishing in the Central Bering Sea to devise
and enforce conservation and management measures for the stocks
in the Central Bering Sea. A regional organization could be established for that purpose. The United States and the Soviet Union
could rely on the Convention's conservation duties to demand that
other states fishing in the Bering Sea work with them and make good
faith efforts to establish and enforce conservation measures in the
Central Bering Sea.
49. CLOS, supra note 3, at arts. 65, 120. Article 120 states: "Article 65 also
applies to the conservation and management of marine mammals in the high seas."
Article 65 provides:
Nothing in this Part [concerning coastal states' jurisdiction over their EEZs]
restricts the right of a coastal State or the competence of an international organization, as appropriate, to prohibit, limit, or regulate the exploitation of
marine mammals more strictly than provided for in this Part. States shall cooperate with a view to the conservation of marine mammals and in the case of
cetaceans shall in particular work through the appropriate international organizations for their conservation, management and study.
Id. at art. 65.
50. See supra note 43.
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While a multilateral approach must be attempted under this theory, if some or all of the fishing states refuse to negotiate, the United
States and the Soviet Union, together with any other cooperating
states, may devise a conservation scheme based upon CLOS Article
119 guidelines. Nothing in the Convention prohibits concerned states
from acting together to devise measures for the conservation and
management of the high seas stocks if other states will not cooperate
and enter into good faith negotiations. So long as cooperation with
other states is attempted, and so long as the measures devised comply with CLOS Article 119 guidelines, the measures would be valid
under the Convention.
III.

THE STRADDLING AND ASSOCIATED STOCKS THEORY

Under the straddling and associated stocks theory the Convention
recognizes the special interests of a coastal state in stocks that are
the same or associated with stocks in the high seas. Straddling and
associated stocks are those stocks that straddle the high seas and
EEZs, migrate from the high seas to EEZs, or vice versa, or that are
dependent on, related to, or otherwise associated with, stocks in the
high seas. The Convention recognizes that the freedom of fishing on
the high seas is limited, and recognizes that the states fishing straddling or associated stocks on the high seas have a duty not to compromise the coastal state's rights over the stocks in its EEZ, and
have a duty not to compromise the coastal state's duty to conserve
the stocks in its EEZ. The Convention also recognizes that the
coastal state and the states fishing the stocks in the high seas have a
duty to seek agreement concerning the conservation of straddling

and associated stocks.
Unique problems arise in conservation of straddling and associated
fish stocks. Conservation of these stocks within the EEZ can be undermined by overfishing on the high seas. The management and conservation of straddling and associated stocks is a problem of great
concern to coastal states. 1 There are a number of articles in the
Convention that deal with this problem.
CLOS Article 116(b) 51 recognizes the freedom to fish on the high
51. For an outline of the problem, see Munro, The Management of Shared Fishery Resources Under Extended Jurisdiction,3(4) MARINE RESOURCE ECON. 271 (1986);
Kawasaki, The 200-Mile Regime and the Management of the Transboundary and High
Seas Stocks, 9 OCEAN MGMT. 7 (1984); Copes, UNCLOS III, supra note 3, at 220-21.
52. CLOS Article 116(b) states: "All States have the right for their nationals to
engage in fishing on the high seas subject to. . .(b) the rights and duties as well as the

seas, but notes that this freedom is subject to the rights, duties, and
interests of coastal states. The article specifically recognizes that the
freedom to fish on the high seas is subject to the following CLOS
Articles: Article 63(2), which concerns stocks or associated stocks
straddling the coastal state's EEZ and the high seas; Article 64,
which concerns highly migratory species-species known to migrate
through many EEZs and high seas areas over the course of their
lifetimes; 53 Article 65, which concerns marine mammals that also
traverse many EEZs and high seas areas;54 Article 66, which concerns anadromous stocks that migrate from internal waters into the
ocean, sometimes traversing beyond the coastal state's EEZ into
other states' EEZs and the high seas; 55 and Article 67, which concerns catadromous species that also migrate from internal waters
into the ocean, sometimes traversing other states' EEZs or the high
5
seas.
All of these articles concern stocks and associated stocks that
straddle one or more EEZs and the high seas, as well as species that
travel between EEZs and the high seas. CLOS Article 116(b) indicates with an "inter alia" that these provisions are not a complete
list. Based upon what is specified, the "inter alia" would logically
refer to other instances where fishing on the high seas would affect
other species that live part of their lives within the coastal state's
EEZ, or perhaps where an EEZ species was related to, or dependent
on, a species of the adjacent high seas area, or where fishing in the
high seas otherwise has a direct effect on stocks in the EEZ.57 In
interests of coastal States provided for, inter alia, in article 63, paragraph 2, and articles
64 to 67. . . ." CLOS, supra note 3, at art. 116(b).
53. CLOS Article 64 indicates:

1.The coastal State and other States whose nationals fish in the region for the

highly migratory species listed in Annex I shall co-operate directly or through

appropriate international organizations with a view to ensuring conservation
and promoting the objective of optimum utilization of such species throughout
the region, both within and beyond the exclusive economic zone. In regions for
which no appropriate international organization exists, the coastal State and
other States whose nationals harvest these species in the region shall co-operate
to establish such an organization and participate in its work.
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 apply in addition to the other provisions of
this Part.
Id. at. art. 64. "This Part" refers to Part V, concerning the EEZ, which includes Articles
55 through 75. Highly migratory species include a variety of tuna, frigate mackerel,
pomfrcts, marlins, sailfish, swordfish, sauries, dolphin, oceanic sharks, and cetaceans. See
id. at annex I; see also I D. O'CONNELL, supra note 17, at 569; Burke, The Law of the
Sea Convention Provisions on Conditions of Access to FisheriesSubject to National
Jurisdiction, 63 OR. L. REv. 73, 107-09 (1984).
54. See supra note 49.
55. See infra section IV.
56. See infra section V.
57. This view would be consistent with CLOS Articles 61 and 119, which concern
conservation of living resources in the EEZ and on the high seas, respectively. Both indicate that states must take into consideration, in establishing conservation measures, in-
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addition, in recognizing that the freedom to fish on the high seas is
subject to the rights, duties, and interests of coastal states, the "inter
alia" would refer to other provisions of the Convention that recognize rights, duties, and interests of the coastal state.58
The coastal state's rights referred to in CLOS Article 116(b) are
the sovereign rights over the species in its EEZ and the species of its
continental shelf.59 The coastal state's duty referred to in Article
116(b) is the duty to conserve those species within its EEZ (which
would include those stocks that are dependent on, related to, or otherwise associated with stocks in the high seas, and those species that
migrate between or straddle the EEZ and the high seas areas) pursuant to CLOS Article 61.60 The coastal state's interest referred to
in Article 116(b) clearly includes the interest of the coastal state in
avoiding negative impacts from fishing in the high seas on the resources within its own EEZ. The interest referred to is not merely

the general interest that all states have in all the living resources in
the high seas area.61 Rather, Article 116(b) appears to recognize a
unique interest of the coastal states.
Article 116(b), in conjunction with CLOS Articles 5662 and 61,
which both concern a coastal state's rights and duties in its EEZs,
subjects the fishing state's freedom to fish to the coastal state's rights
terdependence of stocks and the effects on species associated with, or dependent on, harvested species. See CLOS, supra note 3, at arts. 61, 119.
58. The rights, duties, and interests of coastal states recognized in the CLOS and
incorporated by "inter alia" in CLOS article 116(b) would include the rights of the
coastal state concerning the sedentary species of its continental shelf, as specifically recognized by CLOS Article 77. See infra section VI. Article 116(b) also refers to Article
123, which recognizes the special duties and interests of states concerning enclosed and
semi-enclosed seas. See infra section VII. In addition, Article 116(b) would also refer to
limits on rights, such as the limits in CLOS Article 56 on the rights of the coastal states
in the EEZ, the limit of the breadth of the EEZ in CLOS Article 57, and the limit in
CLOS Article 89 prohibiting assertions of sovereignty over the high seas. See CLOS,
supra note 3, at arts. 56, 57, 89.
59. See CLOS, supra note 3, at arts. 56(l)(a), 77-85; see also infra section VI.
60. See CLOS, supra note 3, at art. 61(3)-(4). Article 61 concerns conservation
of the living resources in the EEZ. Article 61 specifies that the coastal state must determine the allowable catch of the stocks in its EEZ, ensure through proper conservation
and management measures that the stocks are not endangered by overexploitation, ensure that the measures undertaken are designed to maintain or restore populations of
harvested species at levels that can produce maximum sustainable yield, as qualified by
relevant factors, and ensure that available scientific information is exchanged on a regular basis.
61. See supra section II (concerning the general interest of all states in the high
seas stocks).
62. CLOS Article 56 recognizes, inter alia, that the coastal state has sovereign
rights for exploring, exploiting, conserving, and managing the living natural resources in
its EEZ. CLOS, supra note 3, at art. 56.

over, and duty to conserve, the stocks within its EEZ. Thus, fishing
states have a duty to not compromise the coastal state's duty to conserve stocks in the coastal state's EEZ. If stocks within the coastal
state's EEZ, or a conservation scheme regulating these stocks, are
negatively affected by fishing on the high seas, the coastal state can
demand that the fishing states take action to remedy the problem.
The article does not, however, indicate that the coastal state has the
power to impose a conservation scheme, or to prohibit the fishing
states from fishing straddling or associated stocks on the high seas.63
Thus, this provision provides grounds for objection when the coastal
state's rights, duties, or interests are compromised by fishing on the
high seas, and constitutes a basis for demanding fishing states to recognize these rights, duties, and interests, and to fulfill their own duties, but it does not create any authority in the aggrieved state to
ban fishing or impose a conservation scheme on other states.
CLOS Article 8764 states that freedom of the high seas is conditioned by CLOS Articles 116 through 120, the Convention generally, and other rules of international law. This freedom must be exercised with due regard for the interests of other states in their
exercise of the freedom of the high seas. Hence, all provisions of the
Convention that reflect rights, duties, or interests limiting or conditioning the freedom of the seas can be relied upon, in conjunction
with Article 87, to demand that fishing states honor those rights,
duties, and interests.6"
63. Professor Burke disagrees on this point. Because of the recognized rights in,
and duties to conserve, the straddling and associated stocks in the EEZ, he perceives
CLOS Articles 56, 63(2), 87, and 116(b) to allow, by implication, the coastal state to
impose conservation measures on states fishing the stocks in the high seas. See Burke,
supra note 53, at 111-15; W. Burke, Memorandum on Legal Issues in Establishing Fishery Management in the Donut Area in the Bering Sea 9-13 (Jan. 1988) (unpublished
paper written for the Fisheries Mgmt. Found.). Mr. Sullivan also disagrees. See W. Sullivan, Special Problems Concerning Fishing (Jan. 1983) (unpublished paper delivered at
LOS Seminar, Center for Ocean Law and Policy, Univ. of Va., Montego Bay, Jamaica).
Such an interpretation would be inconsistent with the express requirement of Article 56

that the coastal state, in exercising its rights and performing it duties in the EEZ, shall

have due regard for the rights and duties of other states. See CLOS, supra note 3, at art.
56(2).
64. CLOS Article 87 indicates:
1. The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked. Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by this Convention and by other rules of international law. It comprises, inter alia, both
for coastal and land-locked States... (e) freedom of fishing, subject to the conditions laid down in section 2....

2. These freedoms shall be exercised by all States with due regard for the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas. ...
CLOS, supra note 3, at art. 87. Section 2 of the CLOS contains Articles 116 through
120, which concern conservation of resources of the high seas. See supra Section II.
65. When referring to provisions of the CLOS to which the freedom of the high
seas is subject, CLOS Article 87 specifically refers to CLOS Articles 116 through 120.
See supra Section II. By inference then, article 87 would also refer to those provisions
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Article 87, in conjunction with Articles 56 and 61, recognizes that
the freedom to fish is subject to the coastal state's rights over, and
duties to conserve, stocks in its EEZ. Thus, fishing states have a duty
to not compromise the coastal state's duty to conserve stocks in the
coastal state's EEZ, and coastal states can dernand fishing states to
cease fishing practices that undermine conservation schemes in the
EEZ, or otherwise negatively affect stocks in the EEZ. However, like
Article 116(b), Article 87 does not provide authority to impose conservation measures or to prohibit fishing in the high seas.66 Thus,
Article 87 provides coastal states with another basis to demand

states to modify their fishing behavior in the high seas to accommodate coastal states' rights, duties, and interests but does not create
any authority in the aggrieved state to ban fishing or impose a conservation scheme on other states.

CLOS Article 6367 concerns fish stocks and associated fish stocks

that are found within the EEZs of two or more coastal states68 or
within both an EEZ and a high seas area. Section 2 of Article 63
concerns those stocks and associated stocks straddling an EEZ and
the high seas. Article 63(2) specifies that, where a stock or associspecified and incorporated into Article 116(b). See supra text accompanying notes 57-61.
In addition, Article 87 would be referring to CLOS Article 77, which specifically recognizes the rights of the coastal state concerning the sedentary species of its continental
shelf. See supra note 58; see also infra Section VI. Article 87 would also refer to Article
123, which recognizes the special duties and interests of states concerning enclosed and
semi-enclosed seas. See infra Section VII.
66. Professor Burke disagrees on this point. See supra note 63.
67. CLOS Article 63 states:
1. Where the same stock or stocks of associated species occur within the exclusive economic zones of two or more coastal States, these States shall seek, either directly or through appropriate subregional or regional organizations, to
agree upon the measures necessary to co-ordinate and ensure the conservation
and development of such stocks without prejudice to the other provisions of this
Part.
2. Where the same stock or stocks of associated species occur both within the
exclusive economic zone and in an area beyond and adjacent to the zone, the
coastal State and the States fishing for such stocks in the adjacent area shall
seek, either directly or through appropriate subregional or regional organizations, to agree upon the measures necessary for the conservation of these stocks
in the adjacent area.
CLOS, supra note 3, at art. 63.
68. According to CLOS Article 63(1), where a stock or an associated stock straddles the EEZs of two or more coastal states, those states have a duty to seek agreement
on the conservation measures necessary to ensure the conservation of those stocks. Section 1 of Article 63 clearly supports the joint management of the stocks that straddle the
exclusive economic zones of two states. Section 1 does not concern stocks that straddle
the high seas, however, so this section cannot justify assertion of power over stocks that
straddle the high seas. See supra note 67.

ated stock straddles the EEZ of a state and the high seas, "the
coastal State and the States fishing for such stocks in the adjacent
area shall seek. . .to agree upon the measures necessary for the conservation of these stocks in the adjacent area." 9 Article 63(2) recognizes that the coastal state has a special interest in straddling and
associated stocks. It also recognizes that both the coastal state and
the states fishing the stock in the high seas have a special duty to
seek to conserve those stocks. 70 This duty is in addition to the gen71
eral duty and interest all states have in conserving high seas stocks.
Thus, where the same or associated stocks straddle the EEZ and the
high seas, a coastal state may use this provision (in conjunction with
Articles 87 and 116(b)) to demand that states fishing in the high
seas area adjacent to their EEZs negotiate in good faith toward a
conservation regime to protect the stocks.
CLOS Article 63(2) recognizes that the coastal state and fishing
states must seek agreement. But the coastal state has no recourse if
the fishing states negotiate in good faith but no agreement is
reached.72 Article 63(2) does not indicate that the coastal state has
the right or the duty to devise measures for conservation of the
stocks on its own or to impose those measures on the fishing states. If
that were the case, the framers would have specified that it is the
responsibility of the coastal state to devise conservation measures.
(For example, CLOS Article 66(2) provides that "the State of origin. . .shall ensure their conservation by the establishment of appropriate regulatory measures." 73 ) At the very least, the framers would
have required fishing states to cooperate in devising conservation
measures, thereby allowing cooperating states to act. (For example,
CLOS Article 117 provides that "States have the duty to take, or to
co-operate with other States in taking.

. . [conservation]

mea-

sures." 74 ) Article 63(2) does neither. It requires only that states seek
to agree upon measures. Therefore, unless fishing states refuse to negotiate in good faith, coastal states cannot unilaterally devise conservation measures under this theory. Because the coastal state lacks
the right or duty to unilaterally impose the conservation scheme on
other states, the noncoastal fishing states have no duty to comply
with conservation measures devised by the coastal state if the
noncoastal state disagrees with such measures.
None of the CLOS articles indicate that a coastal state has the
69.

CLOS, supra note 3, at art. 63(2) (emphasis added).
CHURCHILL & A. LOWE, supra note 6, at 207; 1 D.
supra note 17, at 568; Copes, UNCLOS III, supra note 3, at 218-19.
71. See supra Section 11.
72. Professor Burke disagrees on this point. See supra note 63.

70. See R.

73. CLOS, supra note 3, at art. 66(2).
74. Id. at art. 117.

O'CONNELL,
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same rights in the high seas adjacent to its EEZ as it does inside the
EEZ itself.7 5 Within its own EEZ, the coastal state can unilaterally
determine management and conservation measures, determine allocations, and prohibit other states from fishing the stock. Had the
framers intended coastal states to have such authority with respect
to high seas areas adjacent to the EEZ, the Convention would have
made no distinction between the EEZ and the high seas. Nor would
the Convention have recognized the limits on the rights of the
coastal states within the EEZs and the limits on the breadth of the
75. In a paper entitled "Special Problems Concerning Fishing," supra note 63,
William Sullivan makes the argument that CLOS Article 63, in conjunction with CLOS
Articles 87 and 116, gives coastal states rights rather than interests in the straddling
stocks in the high seas adjacent to the states' EEZs. First, Mr. Sullivan argues that
CLOS Article 56 (which concerns rights, jurisdiction, and duties of the coastal state in
the EEZ), by using the term "sovereign rights" with regard to fisheries and other resources, means that the coastal states' rights with regard to fisheries are the broadest of
all the coastal states' rights mentioned for the EEZ. Id. at 5.
Mr. Sullivan then notes that Article 87 provides that the high seas freedom of fishing
beyond 200 miles is subject to the conditions set out in other articles. He notes that
Article 116(b) specifically subjects high seas fishing rights to "the rights and duties as
well as the interests of coastal States provided for, inter alia, in Article 63, paragraph
2 .... " Id. He concludes that not only is the right to fish for straddling stocks on the
high seas subject to the Article 63 mandate to seek agreement on conservation measures,
but, because of the "inter alia," the "sovereign rights" under Article 56, and the rights
and duties of the coastal state for conservation and management under CLOS Articles
61, 62, and others, become pertinent. Id.
Article 61 concerns conservation of the living resources in the EEZ and is quite similar

to CLOS Article 119, which concerns conservation of the living resources in the high
seas. Compare CLOS, supra note 3, at art. 61 with CLOS, supra note 3, at art. 119.
Article 62 concerns utilization of the living resources of the EEZ. It specifies that the
coastal state must promote the objective of optimum utilization without undermining
conservation, that the coastal state must determine its capacity to harvest the allowable
catch and give other states access to the surplus of allowable catch that it cannot harvest,
and that it may impose its laws, regulations, and conditions on states given access to its
EEZ, which must be complied with by those states. CLOS, supra note 3, at art. 62.
Mr. Sullivan continues that, "[s]ince the Articles referred to specifically in Article
116(b) all pertain in part to the high seas, the 'inter alia' may be taken as a clarification
that the broad rights and duties of coastal states under other Articles may also be pertinent to high seas fisheries." W. Sullivan, supra note 63, at 5. He then concludes: "Thus,
with the interests of the coastal state so firmly established in a straddling stock, and its
discretion so broad, and the rights of the high seas fishing state so constrained by Articles
87 and 116(b), it appears to be reasonably arguable that the coastal state can insist that
the high seas fishery on a straddling stock cease in the absence of agreement, at least if
the conservation of the stock or the coastal state fishery in the EEZ is threatened." Id.;
see also W. Sullivan, International Agreements Considering EEZ Regimes 6 (Jan. 1984)
(unpublished paper delivered at LOS Seminar, Center for Oceans Law and Policy, Univ.
of Va., Cancun, Mexico, where Mr. Sullivan gives a summary version of the same argument); Kawasaki, supra note 51, at 29 (where the author asserts, without more, that the
CLOS intends states within the region to cooperate concerning straddling and associated
stocks, but these states can exclude fishing vessels from states outside the region).

EEZs. 6 Also, the Convention would not have expressly acknowledged that states are prohibited from asserting sovereignty over the
high seas. 77 And had there been a special exception for high seas
areas that contain straddling stocks, the exception would have been
explicit.
Further, assertion of rights by coastal states over the high seas is
contrary to the requirement in CLOS Article 87 that states exercise
their freedoms of the high seas subject to CLOS Articles 116
through 120, the Convention generally, other rules of international
law, and with due regard for the interests of other states in their
exercise of freedoms of the high seas.78 Also, although Article 87
acknowledges that the freedom of the high seas is subject to a
coastal state's rights, this does not mean that the coastal state's EEZ
rights are extended into the high seas and that new rights are created; it means that these freedoms are subject to rights as they are
recognized and delineated elsewhere in the Convention. This merely
creates in the fishing state a duty to fish in such a way on the high
seas that it does not compromise the coastal state's rights in its EEZ.
There is nothing in Article 87 to indicate that the freedoms of the
high seas are subject to the provisions relating to EEZs and the dictates of a coastal state.
Similarly, the use of "inter alia," in recognizing that the freedom
to fish in the high seas is subject to the rights, duties, and interests of
coastal states, in CLOS Article 116(b), does not indicate that the
rights of a coastal state applicable to its EEZ (expressed in CLOS
Articles 56, 61, and 62) are intended to apply to stocks on the high
seas. Rather, it means that the freedom to fish on the high seas is
subject to rights as they are recognized and delineated elsewhere in
the Convention. This also creates in the fishing state a duty to fish in
such a way on the high seas as to not compromise the coastal state's
rights in its EEZ. The rights of a coastal state within its EEZ were
not meant to be impliedly incorporated to provide to the coastal state
rights over the high seas under either Article 87 or 116(b). Rather,
the limitations on the coastal states' rights expressed in CLOS Article 56 and the express limit to the breadth of the EEZ in CLOS
Article 57 would be incorporated under both articles to prevent the
coastal state from asserting control over the high seas.
Neither does Article 63(2) indicate that the rights of a coastal
76. See CLOS, supra note 3, pt. V (EEZ) (arts. 55-75); id. at pt. VII (High
Seas) (arts. 86-120); id. at art. 56 (which expressly limits the rights of coastal states in
the EEZ, requiring them to "have due regard to the rights and duties of other States");
id. at art. 57 (which expressly limits the breadth of the EEZ to 200 nautical miles).
77. See id. at art. 89 ("No State may validly purport to subject any part of the
high seas to its sovereignty.").
78. See CLOS, supra note 3, at art. 87.
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state in its EEZ extend into the high seas. Had that been intended,
even by implication, there would have been no recognition in Article
63(2) of the participation of noncoastal fishing states in determining
conservation measures. The fact that noncoastal fishing states are allowed to participate in determining the conservation measures indicates that the noncoastal fishing states retain their general interests
79
in high seas stocks with regard to straddling and associated stocks.
Thus, the coastal state can rely upon Articles 56, 61, 87, and
116(b) to demand fishing states take action to alleviate negative effects upon stocks within the coastal state's EEZ, or upon a conservation scheme regulating those stocks, and can rely upon Articles
63(2), 87, and 116(b) to demand that fishing states negotiate in good
faith concerning the conservation of straddling and associated
stocks.80 Only if fishing states refuse to negotiate in good faith concerning conservation of the stocks can a coastal state devise a conservation scheme of its own. But even then, the fishing states need not
comply with it. Coastal states do not have the same rights over
straddling stocks in the high seas that they have over stocks in their
EEZs.
PracticalApplication

Relying on the Convention as a treaty (once it is in force) or as
customary international law, under the straddling and associated
stocks theory, the United States and the Soviet Union (whose stocks
are believed to straddle or be interdependent with the stocks of the
Central Bering Sea) would have a right to demand that fishing states
modify their fisheries to stop the negative impacts upon stocks within
the EEZs of the United States and the Soviet Union. The two states
can rely upon Articles 56, 61, 87, and 116(b) to demand that fishing
states fulfill their duty to limit their fishing to avoid compromising
the rights and duties of the United States and the Soviet Union concerning stocks in their EEZs. But the United States and the Soviet
Union would have a duty to seek agreements with the fishing states
concerning the conservation and management of the straddling or
interdependent stocks, and a duty, together with the fishing states, to
79. See supra Section II (concerning the general interest of all states inhigh seas
stocks).
80. The CLOS orders states to fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed under
the CLOS and to exercise the rights, jurisdiction, and freedoms recognized in the CLOS
in a manner that would not constitute an abuse of rights. CLOS, supra note 3, at art.
300.

devise a conservation regime that reflects all states' interests in the
stock. The two states can rely upon Articles 63(2), 87, and 116(b) to
demand that noncoastal fishing states fulfill their duties to negotiate
in good faith toward a viable conservation scheme. The United
States and the Soviet Union would be required to attempt to manage
straddling and associated stocks on a multilateral basis with the
other states fishing for these stocks in the Central Bering Sea. They

could not manage these stocks on a bilateral basis. 8 '
IV.

THE ANADROMOUS STOCKS THEORY

Under the anadromous stocks theory, the Convention recognizes
that there is no freedom to fish anadromous stocks on the high seas,
with one limited exception. The Convention also recognizes that the
state of origin has a special interest, approaching a right, in its anadromous stocks. The state of origin and states allowed to harvest the
stocks on the high seas have duties to conserve the stocks. The state
of origin has a duty to consult with fishing states, consider their interests, and devise conservation measures. States allowed a directed
or incidental harvest have a duty to provide advice on, and to comply
with, the measures determined by the state of origin.
Under CLOS Article 66,82 harvest of anadromous stocks" in the
81. However, the United States and the Soviet Union could bilaterally manage
the stocks of fish that solely straddle the EEZs of the two states consistent with the
CLOS. See id. at art. 63(1).
82. CLOS Article 66 states:
I. States in whose rivers anadromous stocks originate shall have the primary
interest in and responsibility for such stocks.
2. The States of origin of anadromous stocks shall ensure their conservation by
the establishment of appropriate regulatory measures for fishing in all waters
landward of the outer limits of its exclusive economic zone and for fishing provided for in paragraph 3(b). The State of origin may, after consultations with
the other States referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 fishing these stocks, establish
total allowable catches for stocks originating in its rivers.
3. (a) Fisheries for anadromous stocks shall be conducted only in waters landward of the outer limits of exclusive economic zones, except in cases where this
provision would result in economic dislocation for a State other than the State
of origin. With respect to such fishing beyond the outer limits of the exclusive
economic zone, States concerned shall maintain consultations with a view to
achieving agreement on terms and conditions of such fishing giving due regard
to the conservation requirements and the needs of the State of origin in respect
of these stocks.
(b) The State of origin shall co-operate in minimizing economic dislocation in

such other States fishing these stocks, taking into account the normal catch and
the mode of operations of such States, and all the areas in which such fishing
has occurred.
(c) States referred to in subparagraph (b), participating by agreement with the
State of origin in measures to renew anadromous stocks, particularly by expenditures for that purpose, shall be given special consideration by the State of
origin in the harvesting of stocks originating in its rivers.
(d) Enforcement of regulations regarding anadromous stocks beyond the exclusive economic zone shall be by agreement between the State of origin and the
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high seas is banned, except when it would result in economic disloca-

tion for the fishing state.84 While "economic dislocation" is not defined in the Convention, it implies immediate unavoidable economic
chaos. A negative economic impact alone would not be sufficient to
qualify for the exception. Thus, states that harvest anadromous

stocks on the high seas that cannot show that economic dislocation
would occur if they were to stop such harvesting would be in violation of the Convention. Also, states that did not fish for anadromous
stocks in that particular area of the high seas prior to the signing of
the Convention cannot subsequently begin to do so. Further, even the
states that can prove economic dislocation and continue fishing for
anadromous stocks on the high seas would not be able to expand
their fishery.
States that harvest anadromous stocks on the high seas do so subject to the regulation of the state of origin. CLOS Article 66 recognizes that the state of origin has the primary interest in, and responsibility for, the anadromous stock."5 The state of origin is responsible
for ensuring conservation of the stock, and is recognized to have the
right and duty to establish "appropriate regulatory measures" for
fishing in its EEZ8 6 and in the high seas as well."
other States concerned.
4. In cases where anadromous stocks migrate into or through the waters landward of the outer limits of the exclusive economic zone of a State other than
the State of origin, such State shall co-operate with the State of origin with
regard to the conservation and management of such stocks.
5. The State of origin of anadromous stocks and other States fishing these
stocks shall make arrangements for the implementation of the provisions of this
article, where appropriate, through regional organizations.
Id. at art. 66.
83. Anadromous stocks hatch in fresh water rivers and streams, migrate to the
ocean, where they spend the greater portion of their lives, and then return to the fresh
water stream of their origin to spawn and die. Anadromous stocks include salmon, and
some trout and bass. See Belsky, supra note 3, at 756 n. 112; Copes, UNCLOS III, supra
note 3, at 219; Kindt, supra note 18, at 11-13.

84. CLOS, supra note 3, at art. 66(3)(a); see also R. CHURCHILL & A. LOWE,
supra note 6, at 207-08; 1 D. O'CONNELL, supra note 17, at 568-69.
85. CLOS, supra note 3, at art. 66(1); see also R. CHURCHILL & A. LOWE,
supra note 6, at 207-08; 1 D. O'CONNELL, supra note 17, at 568.
86. CLOS, supra note 3, at art. 66(2).
87. There are sound conservation-based reasons for the framers to have given the
responsibility for conservation of the anadromous stocks to the state of origin, in the high
seas as well as in the state of origin's EEZ, territorial sea, and internal waters. To place
that responsibility on, or to share that responsibility with, an unlimited number of "free
riders" (states that have no investments in the stock) would be detrimental to the stock's
conservation, because the free rider's interest is in harvesting the maximum number of
fish at the least cost.
Free rider states know that the state of origin has a greater interest in the stocks. The

CLOS Article 66(2) directs the state of origin to establish regulatory measures for the EEZ "and for fishing provided for in [Article
66(3)(b)]." 88 While Article 66(3)(b) does not explicitly specify high
seas fishing, the "and" in Article 66(2) indicates that Article
66(3)(b) refers to fishing somewhere other than the state of origin's
EEZ.819 Article 66(3)(b) directs the state of origin to cooperate in

minimizing economic dislocation of states fishing anadromous
stocks."' The reference to "economic dislocation" in Article 66(3)(b)
also appears in Article 66(3)(a) as the exception for allowing fishing
of anadromous stocks on the high seas. CLOS Article 66(3)(a) concerns high seas fishing, and no other subject is referenced elsewhere
in Article 66(3). Consequently, it follows that Article 66(2) acknowledges the state of origin's right and duty to establish regulatory measures to ensure conservation of anadromous stocks even in
the high seas. 91
The state of origin is also explicitly recognized by the Convention
to have the right and duty to establish the total allowable catch for
stocks originating in its rivers. This must be done "after consultations with" states fishing the stocks on the high seas under the eco-

nomic dislocation exception and with states whose EEZs the anadromous stocks migrate to or pass through.92 "Consultation" refers to
one seeking advice, opinions, or information from others. 93 "Consultation" does not generally indicate power on the part of those being
free riders gamble that the state of origin will carry the load by bearing the costs of stock
protection and enhancement in spite of the fact that it will be sharing the benefits with
free riders. Thus, if responsibility for conservation is shared with free riders, these states
would press for fewer restrictions on harvesting the stocks and would resist subsidizing
the costs of stock protection and enhancement. The end result would be diminished stock
protection and enhancement. The state of origin would ultimately cut back its investment
in the stocks because of the great costs, the diminished returns on its investments, and
the continued overfishing by the free riders.
In addition, the framers no doubt recognized that selective escapement-limiting harvest of each fish stock to allow sufficient numbers of each stock to avoid harvest to enable
them to reach their streams of origin to spawn and thereby perpetuate the stock-is
rendered impossible where there is uncontrolled harvest on the high seas. Because the
different stocks of salmon cannot be distinguished until they assemble at the mouths of
the rivers of origin, harvest of anadromous fish on the high seas can result in overfishing
of some stocks and underfishing of others. Selective escapement, to achieve maximum
runs can only be achieved by regulating the harvest, and limiting the harvest to the
mouths of the rivers of origin. Thus, prohibiting harvest of anadromous stocks on the
high seas is a necessary conservation measure to ensure conservation of all stocks. See
Sathre, supra note 19, at 746-48 (1986); Copes, UNCLOS III, supra note 3, at 221;

Copes, Anadromous Fish Stocks, supra note 18, at 240, 243.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

CLOS, supra note 3, at art. 66(2) (emphasis added).
See id. at arts. 66(2), (3)(b).
Id. at art. 66(3)(b).
See id. at art. 66(3); see Kindt, supra note 18, at 40.
See CLOS, supra note 3, at art. 66(2).

See WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
1934); WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 244 (1976 ed.).

573 (2d ed.
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consulted to impose their will on the one seeking it. Thus, it appears
that, after obtaining advisory input, and after considering these interests,94 the state of origin alone determines the total allowable
catch.
CLOS Article 66(3)(a) also directs "states concerned" to "maintain consultations" "with a view to achieving agreement" on terms
and conditions of high seas harvest of the anadromous stocks "giving
due regard to the conservation requirements and the needs of the
state of origin."95 This is a directive to fishing states to provide input
to the state of origin. It does not indicate that the fishing states have
any decisionmaking power. The fishing states merely have the right
to be consulted, and a duty to give advice, opinions, and information
concerning the terms and conditions of high seas harvests. Fishing
states must try to reach an agreement with the state of origin, but
they cannot dictate the terms and conditions they will follow. This is
consistent with the other sections of the article that appear to give
regulatory power to the state of origin.96
Had the framers meant the state of origin to share the decisionmaking power with nonorigin states in determining the total allowable catch and terms and conditions of high seas harvests, they would
have used the words "cooperate with" as they did in CLOS Article
66(4). There, the Convention directs nonorigin states, through whose
EEZs the stocks migrate, to cooperate with the state of origin in the
conservation and management of the stocks.97 There, "cooperate
with" creates duties for all to work together and does not provide
one party with more authority than another. Because the framers
used different words, they likely intended different meanings. In determining the total allowable catch and terms and conditions of high
seas harvests, the framers apparently intended the state of origin to
have the sole decisionmaking power.98
94. This would include the interest of the fishing state in avoiding economic dislocation and the general interest of all states in high seas stocks. See supra Section II
(concerning the general interest of all states in high seas stocks).

95.

CLOS, supra note 3, at art. 66(3)(a).

96. See id. at art. 66(2).
97. Compare id. at art. 66(2) with id. at art. 66(4).
98. All the states from which anadromous stocks originate, including the United
States, the Soviet Union, Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Spain, and Denmark, were present at the CLOS Conference. At the CLOS Conference, the logic of a
special position for states of origin was given universal acknowledgement. The United
States, Canada, and Ireland had the strongest positions in favor of states of origin. Canada and Ireland asserted that states of origin should have exclusive rights over the management and harvesting of anadromous stocks throughout their migratory range. They
did acknowledge, however, the right of other states to fish in their own waters for these

The state of origin's right and duty to regulate for conservation of
the anadromous stocks is both recognized and limited by the requirements, under Article 66(3)(b), that it minimize the economic dislocation of other states fishing the stocks, and that it take into account
the mode of fishing and the areas where fishing has occurred. 9 This
provision creates a duty on the part of the state of origin to phase in
restrictions and phase out fishing where it determines these are
needed to conserve its anadromous stocks. If the state of origin does

not have the authority to impose conservation regulations on states
that fall under the economic dislocation exception, these limits under
Article 66(3)(b) would not be necessary. In fact, it seems that the
state of origin may phase out and ultimately ban the harvest of
anadromous stocks by even an excepted state if it is done in such a
way as to minimize economic dislocation. It is also significant that,
in devising conservation regulations, the state of origin need only
"minimize" economic dislocation-it need not wholly avoid or prevent economic dislocation.
The state of origin's right and duty to regulate for conservation
purposes is again both recognized and limited by CLOS Article
66(3)(c). That article requires that the state of origin give special
consideration to states that participate by agreement with the state

of origin in implementing measures to renew the anadromous
stocks. 100 This subsection recognizes that the state of origin often
shoulders the entire cost of conservation and rehabilitation of the
stock. It implies that other states that shoulder part of the cost

should be allowed an allocation of the stocks. Conversely, it also implies that those that do not contribute can be entirely banned from
fishing the stock. 10 1

species, subject to agreement by the state of origin. The United States asserted a similar
position, but desired an additional proviso to protect its position as an interceptor of
anadromous stocks in its own waters that originated in the waters of other states. The
Soviet Union's position was to allow states of origin only preferential rights outside its
EEZ and to accord priority fishing to other states that participated in measures to renew
the stocks and to those that traditionally fished in the area. Denmark and Japan, both of
which harvest significant amounts of salmon in high seas areas, opposed giving preferential rights to states of origin. See Copes, Anadromous Fish Stocks, supra note 18, at
236-43.
99. See CLOS, supra note 3, at art. 66(3)(b).
100. See id. at arts. 66(2), 66(3)(c).
101. The framers are likely to have recognized that, on equity grounds, the state of
origin should have sole responsibility over the anadromous stocks within the high seas
area. Because the nonorigin states reap the benefits of the state of origin's investments
without sharing the costs, the state of origin constructively subsidizes the nonorigin
states. This situation creates a disincentive for the state of origin to invest its resources in
the anadromous stocks and to forgo competing uses for the resources. In order to encourage conservation of the anadromous stocks, the state of origin should benefit from its
investments by being allowed to harvest anadromous stocks at their optimum yield. Only
after fishermen from the state of origin have taken their capacity from the optimum yield
should the balance be allotted to the nonorigin states. See Kindt, supra note 18, at 13,
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In addition to being able to regulate, for conservation purposes,
the directed harvest of anadromous stocks on the high seas, the state
of origin can regulate states that incidentally harvest anadromous
stocks while fishing on the high seas for nonanadromous stocks. The
state of origin can even regulate to eliminate the incidental catch, so
long as it cooperates in minimizing the economic dislocation of the
fishing states. The state of origin clearly has this power because it
can determine conservation measures, including the total allowable
catch, for its anadromous species and can impose terms and conditions on those fishing the anadromous stock in the high seas. 102 The
power to determine the total allowable catch would be meaningless
unless it included the power to minimize and eliminate incidental
catch. This power would include imposition of fishing gear
restrictions.
The right and duty of the state of origin is limited, and appears to
be undermined, by CLOS Article 66(3)(d). Article 66(3)(d) provides that "[e]nforcement of regulations regarding anadromous
stocks beyond the exclusive economic zone shall be by agreement
between the State of origin and the other States concerned." 10 3
Thus, while the state of origin may have the power to establish regulations for the high seas area, it cannot unilaterally enforce them.
However, those fishing states that refuse to follow the regulations
would be in breach of their duty to comply with the measures. While
the article may not explicitly state that fishing states have duties
under the Convention to comply with the state of origin's regulatory
measures, that is implicit in Article 66.104 In addition to the responsibility recognized in CLOS Article 66, the duties are also recognized by CLOS Articles 87 and 116.15
15; Copes, Anadromous Fish Stocks, supra note 18, at 240, 244.
102. See CLOS, supra note 3, at arts. 66(2), 66(3)(a), 66(3)(b); see also Copes,
Anadromous Fish Stocks, supra note 18, at 244-45.
103. CLOS, supra note 3, at art. 66(3)(d).
104. Analysts of CLOS Article 66 uniformly criticize it for not providing sufficient
powers to the state of origin to protect the anadromous stocks. See Sathre, supra note 19,
at 752-53; Kindt, supra note 18, at 15-16; Copes, Anadromous Fish Stocks, supra note
18, at 245-47. In some aspects, however, these authors may have given Article 66 short
shrift because they do not seem to recognize the burdens and responsibilities placed on
nonorigin states.
105. CLOS Article 87 subjects the freedom of the high seas to provisions of the
CLOS, including CLOS Article 66. See CLOS, supra note 3, at art. 87. CLOS Article
116(b) indicates that the freedom to fish on the high seas is subject to the rights, duties,
and interests of coastal states. Id. at art. 116(b). Because Article 66 recognizes the special right, duty, and interest that the state of origin has in its anadromous stocks in the
high seas, Article 116(b) implicitly incorporates these. Thus, Articles 87 and 116(b) can

To summarize, under CLOS Article 66, in conjunction with Articles 87 and 116(b), states' freedom of fishing on the high seas is
subject to the duty to refrain from harvest of anadromous stocks unless they can prove that economic dislocation would result. Hence,
the state of origin can demand that nonexception states cease their
harvest of anadromous stocks on the high seas. States allowed to
continue a directed harvest or to incidentally harvest anadromous
stocks have a duty to comply with appropriate conservation measures
devised by the state of origin. These measures can include total allowable catch determinations, terms and conditions, phase-out of directed harvest, and phase-in of fishing gear restrictions to minimize
or eliminate incidental catch of anadromous stocks. The state of origin must consider the interests of states whose EEZs the stocks pass
through and the states allowed by Article 66 to continue harvesting
the anadromous stock, must allow their input, and must cooperate to
minimize the fishing states' economic dislocation.
PracticalApplication
Most, if not all, of the anadromous stocks in the Central Bering

Sea originate in the internal waters of the United States and the
Soviet Union. Relying on the Convention as a treaty (once it is in
force) or as customary international law, under CLOS Article 66 in
conjunction with Articles 87 and 116(b) and the anadromous stocks
theory, the United States and the Soviet Union can demand other
states cease harvesting anadromous stocks in the Central Bering Sea
unless the states can show they harvested the stocks in that particular area of the high seas prior to the signing of the Convention, and
termination of the harvest would result in their economic dislocation.
In addition, after consulting with and considering the interests of
states whose EEZs the stocks pass through and the states allowed to
harvest the anadromous stocks in the Central Bering Sea, including
those who harvest them incidentally, the United States and the Soviet Union could unilaterally or bilaterally determine the total allowable catch, impose terms and conditions on harvests, and devise
whatever other measures they deem appropriate. The United States
and the Soviet Union must cooperate in minimizing economic dislobe relied upon by the state of origin to demand that states not allowed to continue harvesting anadromous stocks on the high seas refrain from harvesting these stocks. In addition, the state of origin can demand that states harvesting anadromous stocks under the
Article 66 economic dislocation exception, whether as a directed harvest or as an incidental catch, comply with the conservation measures devised pursuant to the right and duty
recognized in Article 66. See supra Section III. In addition, the CLOS requires that
states fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed under the CLOS, and that they exercise the rights, jurisdiction, and freedoms recognized in the CLOS in a manner that
would not constitute an abuse of rights. CLOS, supra note 3, at art. 300.
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cation of the states allowed to harvest the fish, however. Measures
could include phase-out of directed harvest and phase-in of fishing
gear restrictions to minimize or eliminate incidental harvest.
CLOS Article 66 requires the state of origin to obtain agreement
for enforcement, so the United States and the Soviet Union would
need to seek agreement for enforcement. But, regardless of the existence of an enforcement agreement, fishing states that refuse to follow measures devised by the United States and the Soviet Union
would be in breach of their duty to comply with the measures.
V.

THE CATADROMOUS SPECIES THEORY

Under the catadromous species theory, the Convention recognizes
that there is no freedom of fishing on the high seas for catadromous
species. (These are species that live their lives in fresh water and
then migrate to the ocean to spawn. 106) Article 67107 of the Convention recognizes that the harvest of catadromous species in the high
seas is prohibited.' 08 States fishing in the high seas have a duty to
refrain from harvesting catadromous species, pursuant to CLOS Articles 87 and 116(b).109 Article 67 also recognizes the special interest
106. See R. CHURCHILL & A. LOWE, supra note 6, at 208. Catadromous species
include eels. See Belsky, supra note 3, at 756 n.112.
107. CLOS Article 67 provides:
1. A coastal State in whose waters catadromous species spend the greater part
of their life cycle shall have responsibility for the management of these species
and shall ensure the ingress and egress of migrating fish.
2. Harvesting of catadromous species shall be conducted only in waters landward of the outer limits of exclusive economic zones. When conducted in exclusive economic zones, harvesting shall be subject to this article and the other
provisions of this Convention concerning fishing in these zones.
3. In cases where catadromous fish migrate through the exclusive economic
zone of another State, whether as juvenile or maturing fish, the management,
including harvesting, of such fish shall be regulated by agreement between the
State mentioned in paragraph 1 and the other State concerned. Such agreement shall ensure the iational management of the species and take into account the responsibilities of the State mentioned in paragraph 1 for the maintenance of these species.
CLOS, supra note 3, at art. 67.
108. Id. at art. 67(2); see also R. CHURCHILL & A. LOWE, supra note 6, at 208; 1
D. O'CONNELL, supra note 17, at 569.

109. CLOS Article 87 subjects the freedom of the high seas to provisions of the

CLOS, including CLOS Article 67. See CLOS, supra note 3, at art. 87. CLOS Article
116(b) indicates that the freedom of fishing on the high seas is subject to the rights,
duties, and interests of coastal states. Id. at art. 116(b). Because Article 67 recognizes
the state in whose waters catadromous species spend the greater part of their life cycle to
have a special right, duty, and interest in the stock, see supra note 103 and accompanying text, Article 116(b) implicitly incorporates these. See supra Section III. In addition,
the CLOS requires that states fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed under the

or quasi-right of the state in which catadromous species spend the
greater part of their life cycle."1 This state has a duty to ensure the
conservation of its catadromous stocks."' Thus, a state whose catadromous species migrate into high seas areas may rely on CLOS Article 67, in conjunction with Articles 87 and 116(b), to demand that
other states cease harvest of the species on the high seas.
PracticalApplication
It is unknown whether any catadromous species migrate into the
Central Bering Sea and whether they are being harvested there. If
there are catadromous species in the Central Bering Sea being harvested that originated in waters of the United States or the Soviet
Union, relying on the Convention as a treaty (once it is in force) or

as customary international law, under the catadromous species theory, these states, either unilaterally or bilaterally depending on the
origin of the catadromous species, could use CLOS Article 67, in
conjunction with CLOS Articles 87 and 116(b), as a basis to stop
the illegal harvest.

VI.

THE SEDENTARY SPECIES THEORY

Under the sedentary species theory, the Convention recognizes
that there is no freedom of fishing on the high seas concerning sedentary species of the seabed and subsoil of the continental shelf. Sedentary species are "organisms which, at the harvestable stage, either
are immobile on or under the sea-bed or are unable to move except
while in constant physical contact with the sea-bed or the subsoil."'1 2
The "continental shelf" is defined in CLOS Article 76."1 The definition is technical, but the continental shelf generally consists of the
seabed and subsoil below coastal waters that naturally extend the
coastal state's land territory to the outer edge of the continental
margin." 4 Alternatively, the continental shelf may extend to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baseline from which the
CLOS and exercise the rights, jurisdiction, and freedoms recognized in the CLOS in a
manner that would not constitute an abuse of rights. CLOS supra note 3, at art. 300; see
also R. CHURCHILL & A. LOWE, supra note 6, at 208; 1 D. O'CONNELL, supra note 17,

at 569.
110.
at 569.
111.

CLOS, supra note 3, at art. 67(1); see also 1 D. O'CONNELL, supra note 17,
CLOS, supra note 3, at art. 67(1).

112. Id. at art. 77(4). Sedentary species include clams, oysters, mussels, crabs, and
lobster. See R. CHURCHILL & A. LOWE, supra note 6, at 201; Tanaka, supra note 11, at
176, 179-80.

113.

Id. at art. 76; see also id. at annex II.

114.

"The continental margin comprises the submerged prolongation of the land

mass of the coastal State, and consists of the sea-bed and subsoil of the shelf, the slope
and the rise." Id. at art. 76(3); see also id. at final act annex II.
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breadth of the territorial sea is measured" 5 if the outer edge of the
continental margin does not extend to that distance."'
CLOS Article 77117 recognizes that a coastal state has exclusive
rights over living and nonliving resources of the seabed and subsoil
of the continental shelf."18 Because the coastal state has exclusive
rights to these sedentary species, there is no freedom of fishing for
these species on the high seas. Consequently, the fishing states have
a duty to refrain from harvesting sedentary species on the high seas,
pursuant to CLOS Articles 87 and 116(b).1" 9 Thus, harvest of sedentary species by any state other than the coastal state would be contrary to the Convention. The coastal state could invoke CLOS Articles 76 and 77, in conjunction with Articles 87 and 116(b), to
demand that the harvest stop.
Article 77 provides no express basis for assertion of management
control over the free-swimming finfish that inhabit the high seas
above the continental shelf. However, if a finfish fishery, such as a
bottom trawl fishery, had a significant incidental catch of sedentary
species or was conducted in such a way as to damage the sedentary
species, Article 77 could be relied upon to justify regulation of the
115. See supra note 3.
116. CLOS, supra note 3, at art. 76(1).
117. CLOS Article 77 states:
1. The coastal State exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the

purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources.
2. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 are exclusive in the sense that if the
coastal State does not explore the continental shelf or exploit its natural resources, no one may undertake these activities without the express consent of
the coastal State.
3. The rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf do not depend on
occupation, effective or notional, or on any express proclamation.
4. The natural resources referred to in this Part consist of the mineral and
other non-living resources of the sea-bed and subsoil together with living organisms belonging to sedentary species, that is to say, organisms which, at the
harvestable stage, either are immobile on or under the sea-bed or are unable to
move except in constant physical contact with the sea-bed or the subsoil.
Id. at art. 77.
118. Id. at arts. 77(1), 77(2); see also 1 D. O'CONNELL, supra note 17, at 568. For
other rights concerning the continental shelf, see CLOS, supra note 3, at arts. 78-85.
119. CLOS Article 87 subjects the freedom of the high seas to provisions of the
CLOS, including CLOS Article 77. See CLOS, supra note 3, art. 87. CLOS Article
116(b) indicates that the freedom of fishing on the high seas is subject to the rights,
duties, and interests of coastal states. Id. at art. 116(b). Because Article 77 recognizes
the coastal state's rights concerning the sedentary species of its continental shelf, Article
116(b) implicitly incorporates these. See supra Section III. The CLOS also directs states
to fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed under the CLOS and exercise the rights,
jurisdiction, and freedoms recognized in the CLOS in a manner that would not constitute
an abuse of rights. Id. at art. 300; see also Burke, supra note 53, at 115-16.

finfish fishery to minimize or eliminate incidental harvest or damage.
PracticalApplication
The United States has recently adopted the definition of the continental shelf that is provided in CLOS Article 76. Based on this definition, the United States considers its continental shelf to include all
of the seabed out to the United States-Russian Convention Line of
1867.120 The Convention Line passes through the western portion of

the Central Bering Sea, giving the United States the majority of the
continental shelf under the Central Bering Sea. The Soviet Union
claims that its continental shelf extends out to the Convention Line
as well, but it disputes the exact location of the line.
Assuming that the seabed under the Central Bering Sea is made
up of the continental shelves of the United States and the Soviet
Union, relying on the Convention as a treaty (once it is in force) or
as customary international law, under the sedentary species theory
the two states have sovereign rights over the sedentary species of
their respective portions of the seabed and subsoil. The two states
together have sovereign rights over the entire seabed below the Central Bering Sea. Thus, they can either unilaterally manage and exploit the sedentary species on their respective portions of the continental shelf, or they can agree to manage and exploit them
bilaterally. It is unknown whether sedentary species are being harvested by noncoastal states. If a noncoastal state were to harvest the
sedentary species of the continental shelf of the United States or the
Soviet Union, the aggrieved state(s) could rely upon CLOS Article
77, in conjunction with CLOS Articles 87 and 116(b), to demand
that the harvest stop. Neither the United States nor the Soviet
Union could rely upon Article 77 to justify assertion of management

control over finfish in the Central Bering Sea unless it could be
shown that a finfish fishery has a significant incidental catch of sedentary species or was conducted in such a way as to damage the
sedentary species.
VII.

THE ENCLOSED AND SEMI-ENCLOSED SEAS THEORY

Under the enclosed and semi-enclosed seas theory, littoral states
(states bordering on enclosed and semi-enclosed seas) have a special
interest in the enclosed and semi-enclosed seas they border. The freedom to fish on the high seas within enclosed and semi-enclosed seas
is subject to that special interest. Also, nonlittoral fishing states, as
120. This line was established as an international boundary when Russia ceded
Alaska to the United States after its purchase in 1867. See Treaty Concerning the Cession of the Russian Possessions in North America, Mar. 30, 1867, United StatesU.S.S.R., 15 Stat. 539, T.S. No. 301 (entered into force June 20, 1867).
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well as littoral states, have a special duty to cooperate to conserve
the stocks there.
CLOS Article 122 defines "enclosed or semi-enclosed sea" as either a "sea surrounded by two or more States and connected to another sea or the ocean by a narrow outlet[,] or [a sea] consisting
entirely or primarily of the territorial seas and exclusive economic
zones of two or more coastal States.' 121 Enclosed and semi-enclosed
seas merit special attention because of their unique characteristics
and problems. Because they are enclosed, fishing can have a significant impact upon stocks in the entire sea. Fish stocks in enclosed and
semi-enclosed seas may be related to, dependent on, or part of the
same complex stock. As a result, the littoral states have a great interest in any fishing occurring in the enclosed or semi-enclosed sea.
Where the enclosed or semi-enclosed sea contains a pocket of high
seas, the littoral states have a much greater interest in the stocks in
the high seas pocket than do nonlittoral fishing states. 1 22 Littoral
states have the most to lose if stocks are overfished in the high seas
pocket, because the stocks in their EEZs may be threatened by
overfishing in the high seas pocket. Nonlittoral fishing states can fish
elsewhere if the stocks become overfished. They do not have to forgo
fishing in their EEZs to revive the stocks.
In addition to the littoral states' special interest in conserving the
stocks, there is an explicit requirement in CLOS Article 123 for littoral states to cooperate to conserve the stocks. 12 3 Article 123124 directs states bordering an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea to "cooperate
with each other in the exercise of their rights and in the performance
121. CLOS, supra note 3, at art. 122.
122. See supra Section III.
123. See CLOS, supra note 3, at art. 123 ("States bordering an enclosed or semienclosed sea should co-operate with each other.
124. CLOS article 123 states:
States bordering an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea should co-operate with each
other in the exercise of their rights and in the performance of their duties
under this Convention. To this end they shall endeavor, directly or through an

appropriate regional organization:

(a) to co-ordinate the management, conservation, exploration and exploitation
of the living resources of the sea;
(b) to co-ordinate the implementation of their rights and duties with respect to
the protection and preservation of the marine environment;
(c) to co-ordinate the scientific research policies and undertake where appropriate joint programmes of scientific research in the area;
(d) to invite, as appropriate, other interested States or international organizations to co-operate with them in furtherance of the provisions of this article.
Id. at art. 123.

of their duties under [the] Convention." 125 These states are directed
to "endeavour, directly or through an appropriate regional organization. . .to co-ordinate the management, conservation, exploration
and exploitation of the living resources of the sea. . . [and] to invite,
as appropriate, other interested States or international organizations
to cooperate with them in furtherance of the[se] provisions. ... "I"

Article 123 does not recognize new rights or duties (except for the
special duty to cooperate). Rather, it limits the littoral states to
rights and duties recognized elsewhere in the Convention. Elsewhere
in the Convention, states are recognize to have rights over their territorial seas127 and their EEZs.1 2s The Convention explicitly limits the
territorial sea to twelve nautical miles and the EEZ to 200 nautical
miles from the baseline. 129 Elsewhere in the Convention, states are
recognized to have the following duties: To conserve the living
marine resources in their EEZ and in the high seas;130 to refrain
11
from harvesting the living marine resources in other states' EEZs;"
1 32
stocks;
to seek agreement in conserving straddling and associated
to cooperate in conserving highly migratory species and marine
mammals; 33 and to conserve their own and refrain from harvesting
other states' anadromous, catadromous, and sedentary species."3
Thus, CLOS Article 123, in conjunction with Articles 87 and
116(b), incorporates these limits on the freedom to fish in the high
seas pockets in enclosed and semi-enclosed seas. 3 5
While a number of authors advocate granting littoral states rights
over stocks in high seas pockets in enclosed and semi-enclosed
seas, 38 this view is not reflected in Article 123 and is inconsistent

II.

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id.
Id.
See
See
See
See

131.

See CLOS, supra note 3, at arts. 58, 62.

id., at arts. 2-16.
id. at arts. 55-75.
id. at arts. 3, 4, 57; see also supra note 3.
CLOS, supra note 3, at arts. 61, 87, 116(c)-120; see also supra Section

132. See id. at arts. 63(2), 87, 116(b); see also supra Section III.

133. See CLOS, supra note 3, at arts. 64, 65; see also supra Section III.
134. See CLOS, supra note 3, at arts. 66, 67, 77; see also supra Sections IV-VI.
135. CLOS Article 87 subjects the freedom of the high seas to other provisions of
the CLOS, including Article 123. See CLOS, supra note 3, at art. 87. Article 116(b)
indicates that the freedom to fish on the high seas is subject to the rights, duties, and
interests of coastal states. Id. at art. 116(b). Because CLOS article 123 recognizes that
littoral states have special interests in the stock and duties to cooperate, Article 116(b)
implicitly incorporates these. These provisions can be relied upon to demand that states
cooperate to conserve the stocks in enclosed and semi-enclosed seas. See supra Section
III. In addition, the CLOS requires that states fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed under the CLOS in a manner that would not constitute an abuse of rights. CLOS,
supra note 3, at art. 300.
136. Prior to the CLOS Conferences, when EEZs had not yet been recognized,
G.C. Gidel believed that where two territorial seas of different states have some contact,
the tendency was to eliminate pockets of high seas, and to divide straits by reference to
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with other provisions of the Convention. While Article 123 clearly

recognizes that littoral states have a special interest and a special
duty to cooperate in conserving stocks in the enclosed and semi-enclosed seas, the article does not grant littoral states rights over the

stocks in high seas pockets. Elsewhere in the Convention, Article 89
asserts: "No State may validly purport to subject any part of the
high seas to its sovereignty." In addition, assertion of rights over
stocks in high seas pockets would be contrary to the Convention's
prescription to exercise freedoms of the high seas with due regard for
the interests of other states in their exercise of freedom of the high
seas.' 37 Assertion of rights over stocks in high seas pockets is also

inconsistent with the provisions that recognize all states' interests in
the median line. See 2 D. O'CONNELL, supra note 1, at 679-81 (citing G.C. GIDEL, 3 LE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC DE LA MER 760 (1932-34)).
According to D. O'Connell, at the time of the Hague Codification Conference it was
assumed that pockets of high seas could be eliminated if they were small. He notes that
it was proposed that pockets of high seas be eliminated if not more than two miles separated the limits of opposite territorial waters. That proposal was adopted by the International Law Commission, but at the Geneva Conference, four states, including the United
States, introduced proposals to delete all reference to pockets of high seas because of
disagreement over the scope of the proposal. Mr. O'Connell notes that, in practice, where
there have been small pockets of high seas, the question has been resolved either by use
of the straight baseline technique, or by arbitrary use of the median line, irrespective of
distance. He notes that the maritime boundary between Indonesia and Malaysia is drawn
by means of equidistant lines from the baseline of the territorial waters of each state and
contains a pocket of high seas of about 40 square miles. See 2 D. O'CONNELL, supra note
1, at 679-81.
Lewis Alexander stated, prior to the CLOS and recognition of EEZs, that in the years
since the 1958 Geneva Convention, the tendency has been for states, both alone and in
combination with others, to gradually expand seaward their claims in the oceans by
smoothing over coastal irregularities, drawing straight baselines along indented or islandstudded coasts, and closing off gulfs and bays to foreign users. He noted that this was
done by the Soviet Union in 1956 with respect to the Sea of Okhotsk, and by Canada
with respect to the Gulf of St. Lawrence. Mr. Alexander believed that the semi-enclosed
seas along the margin of the ocean required special treatment because of their unique
problems. He thought that a special juridical regime should be imposed on semi-enclosed
seas by all or most of the littoral states, even though it could create difficulties for international community interests. Mr. Alexander also advocated imposition of a variety of
regimes by littoral states in the enclosed and semi-enclosed seas, including a fisheries
management regime. Under his proposal, nonlittoral states' fishing would be conditional
upon their compliance with the regime. See Alexander, Special Circumstances:Semienclosed Seas, in LAW OF THE SEA: THE EMERGING REGIME OF THE OCEANS 201-15 (1974);

see also Alexander, Regionalism and the Law of the Sea: The Case of Semi-enclosed
Seas, 2(2) OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 151 (1974) [hereinafter Alexander, Regionalism]; D.
LARSON, MAJOR ISSUES OF THE LAW OF THE SEA

200-02 (1976).

It should be noted, however, that with the creation of EEZs all but a few enclosed and

semi-enclosed seas are now subsumed within EEZs. See Alexander, Regionalism, supra,

at 158; D.

LARSON,

supra, at 203-06.

137. See CLOS, supra note 3, at art. 87; see also supra Section III.

the stocks of the high seas. 3 ' Also, assertion of rights over the stocks
in high seas pockets would probably constitute an "abuse of right" in
violation of the Convention.' 39
A number of authors concur that littoral states do not have rights
over stocks in high seas pockets. 140 Further, it is unlikely that Article
123 was intended to recognize special rights concerning high seas
pockets within the enclosed and semi-enclosed seas because most enclosed and semi-enclosed seas do not contain high seas pockets.' 4 '
In the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, those discussing a special legal
status for enclosed and semi-enclosed seas wanted to restrict freedom
of navigation, fishing rights, and scientific research, and they wanted
to implement pollution regulation. Some feared that this would
break down the universal law of the sea into several systems of regional norms. This perception may have caused the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea to refuse to recognize such powers.

Some members of the Conference supported special treatment for
enclosed and semi-enclosed seas. Some proposals would have expanded the powers of littoral states and limited the freedoms of nonlittoral states. Among these was the Turkish proposal, which proposed applying provisions relating to territorial seas and EEZs to
enclosed and semi-enclosed seas. Attempts to impair the rights of the
nonlittoral states were opposed from the beginning, however, and the
Turkish proposal was not adopted. It appears that the drafters of
138. See CLOS, supra note 3, at arts. 116(c)-120; see also supra Section II.
139. See CLOS, supra note 3, at art. 300 (directing states to fulfill in good faith
the obligations assumed under the CLOS, and to exercise the rights, jurisdiction, and
freedoms recognized in the CLOS in a manner which would not constitute an abuse of
rights).
140. One supporter of this theory, Mr. Symonides, believes that the essence of
CLOS Article 123 is the principle of cooperation and that Article 123 requires international agreements of various types. He asserts that, because Article 123 envisages inviting other states to participate, littoral states could not be excluded from these agreements. But he thinks that the CLOS does not grant them additional rights that would
allow a departure from the generally binding rules or allow them to restrict, by means of
regional agreements, the rights of a third party. Relying upon Article 87, Mr. Symonides
also asserts that any activity detrimental to the legitimate interests of other states would
be banned. He suggests that this activity would include excessive fishing and mismanagement of living resources. Mr. Symonides also asserts that a state must participate in good
faith with the intention of reaching an agreement. See Symonides, The Legal Status of
the Enclosed and Semi-enclosed Seas, 27 GER. Y.B. INT'L L. 315, 327-33 (1984).
Another supporter of this theory, Mr. Staynov, argues that new technologies allowing
greater exploitation of marine resources, a growing threat of pollution, and greater interdependence of neighboring states, have compelled rejection of the traditional idea of
mare liberum (free sea) in enclosed and semi-enclosed seas. While he does not believe
unfettered freedoms could be exercised, Mr. Staynov believes regulation could not be
achieved without consent of nonlittoral states. See P. Staynov, Establishment of a Special InternationalStatute of the Semi-enclosed Seas, in 2 BULGARIAN ASSOCIATION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, STUDIES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 32 (1974).

141. See Alexander, Regionalism, supra note 136, at 158; D.
136, at 203-06.

LARSON,

supra note
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Article 123 did not want to limit the rights of nonlittoral states and
grant to littoral states the same rights over enclosed seas and semi12
enclosed seas that they enjoyed over their territorial seas or EEZs.
In addition, there are a number of regional agreements relating to
management of enclosed and semi-enclosed seas. None of these
agreements allow littoral states special treatment, nor do they impair
the rights of third parties. Generally, these conventions are not restrictive; they are open to participation' by any state interested in
implementing their objectives and tasks. This practice seems to be
reflected in the Convention. 43
Because CLOS Article 123 does not recognize littoral states'
rights over stocks in high seas pockets in enclosed and semi-enclosed
seas, the article requires littoral states to share management control
over these stocks with nonlittoral fishing states. It appears, however,
that littoral states are not prevented from acting to conserve the
stocks if the nonlittoral fishing states are not willing to cooperate.
Article 123 directs the littoral states to "co-operate with each other"
and "endeavor, directly or through an appropriate regional organization. . .to invite, as appropriate, other interested states ... .
This provision seems to indicate that littoral states are necessary parties for determining conservation regimes within enclosed and semienclosed seas. "Appropriate" states should be invited to join the littoral states in determining conservation measures in the enclosed or
semi-enclosed sea, and "appropriate" states would most likely include all those states fishing in the high seas pocket of the enclosed
or semi-enclosed sea. Apparently, however, nonlittoral fishing states
are not necessary parties for determining conservation regimes. If
invited nonlittoral fishing states choose not to participate, littoral
states remain free to coordinate management without them. The duties providing the authority to create conservation regimes are incorporated from elsewhere in the Convention, and there are no guidelines for development of conservation regimes in Article 123.
Therefore, management regimes would need to be devised along Ar142. See Symonides, supra note 140, at 319-22. According to D.O'Connell, in his
comprehensive text on the CLOS, at the Geneva Conference, it was proposed that pockets of high seas be eliminated if not more than two miles separated the limits of opposite
territorial waters. However, four states, including the United States, introduced proposals
to delete all reference to pockets of high seas because of disagreement over the scope of
the proposals. Thus, no text was included on the subject of elimination of pockets of high
seas. See supra note 136. Mr. O'Connell did not indicate that the CLOS provided this
authority. Thus, he apparently did not perceive Article 123 to provide for this.
143. See Symonides, supra note 140, at 330-33.
144. CLOS, supra note 3, at art. 123 (emphasis added).

ticle 119 guidelines.
Thus, the main purpose of CLOS Article 123 is merely to emphasize to littoral states the importance of carrying out all the rights
and duties recognized elsewhere in the Convention within the context
of enclosed and semi-enclosed seas. Article 123 also recognizes the
littoral states' special interest in these seas and it recognizes the duty
to cooperate concerning conservation of stocks there. Under Article
123, in conjunction with Articles 87 and 116(b), and incorporating
the other rights and duties recognized elsewhere in the Convention,
fishing states' freedom to fish in high seas pockets is subject to the
littoral states' special interest. Littoral states must cooperate to devise a conservation scheme for the stocks in the enclosed or semienclosed sea, and must invite nonlittoral fishing states to cooperate.
If nonlittoral fishing states choose not to cooperate, however, littoral
states, together with cooperating nonlittoral fishing states, may still
devise a conservation scheme for the stocks in the enclosed or semienclosed sea along Article 119 guidelines.
PracticalApplication
The Bering Sea appears to qualify as a semi-enclosed sea under
both definitions: it is surrounded by the United States and the Soviet
Union and is connected to the Arctic and Pacific Oceans by narrow
outlets; alternatively, it consists largely of the territorial seas and the
EEZs of the United States and the Soviet Union. Relying on the
Convention as a treaty (once it is in force) or as customary international law, under the enclosed and semi-enclosed seas theory the
United States and the Soviet Union, as the littoral states, have the
special interests recognized under Article 123. The United States
and the Soviet Union are responsible for forging a multilateral
agreement with cooperating nonlittoral fishing states for the conservation of the pollock and other stocks in the Central Bering Sea.
They could do this by creating a regional organization and inviting
nonlittoral fishing states to help coordinate the management regime.
The United States and the Soviet Union could, together with cooperating nonlittoral fishing states, devise a conservation scheme along
Article 119 guidelines. Relying on Article 123, in conjunction with
Articles 87 and 116(b), and incorporating other rights and duties
recognized elsewhere in the Convention, the United States and the
Soviet Union can demand that nonlittoral fishing states comply with
the conservation measures.
VIII. DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND ENFORCEMENT

The Convention contains methods for the settlement of disputes. It
orders states to settle disputes by peaceful means, which may be any
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peaceful means chosen by the disputing parties. 45 Where no settlement can be reached concerning the interpretation or application of
the Convention and where no alternative means of dispute resolution
has been agreed to, the dispute resolution procedure outlined in the

Convention applies. 46
When a dispute arises between states about their freedoms, rights,
duties, or interests under the Convention, the parties to the dispute

must proceed expeditiously to an exchange of views regarding its settlement by negotiation or other peaceful means.4 The Convention
permits a party to a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention to invite the other party or parties to submit
the dispute to conciliation in accordance with Convention or other
conciliation procedures. 48 Where resolution has not been reached
through negotiation, conciliation, or any other method agreed to by
the disputing parties, provisions for compulsory binding decisionmaking apply and any disputant may request the dispute to be submitted to the court or tribunal given jurisdiction by the
Convention. 48
States are subject to the methods of dispute resolution chosen by
written declaration either upon signing the Convention or any time
thereafter.' 50 A state that has not chosen any specific method of dispute resolution is deemed to have accepted arbitration as a means of

145. See id. at arts. 279, 280, 281, 282; see also id. at arts. 301 (in exercising their
rights and performing their duties under the CLOS, states shall refrain from any threat
or use of force inconsistent with the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations), 88 (the high seas are reserved for peaceful purposes).
146. Id. at art. 281.
147. Id. at art. 283.
148. Id. at art. 284; see id. at annex V.
149. Id. at art. 286. While Mr. Sullivan intimates in Special Problems Concerning
Fishing,supra note 63, at 6, that disputes between coastal states and other states fishing
a straddling stock on the high seas are not subject to compulsory arbitration because
coastal states have sovereign rights over the stocks, he is mistaken. Only with respect to
fisheries in their EEZ's do coastal states have sovereign rights and are therefore not
subject to compulsory arbitration. See CLOS, supra note 3, at arts. 56, 297(3). There is
no exception to compulsory arbitration for disputes concerning fisheries in the high seas.
Article 297 provides an exception at the coastal state's discretion only for fisheries in the
EEZ, over which a coastal state has sovereign rights. See id. at art. 297. Therefore,
CLOS Article 288 subjects all disputes relating to high seas stocks to compulsory arbitration: disputes concerning conservation of stocks straddling the coastal state's EEZ and
the high seas and related stocks in the high seas, disputes concerning illegal harvest of
anadromous and catadromous species in the high seas and of sedentary species on the
continental shelf, and disputes concerning conservation of other stocks in the high seas.
See id.; see also Burke, supra note 53, at 116-19.
150. CLOS, supra note 3, at art. 287(1).

dispute resolution.151 If the disputing parties have all chosen the
same method of dispute resolution, the dispute must only be submitted to that procedure, unless the parties agree otherwise. 152 Where
states have chosen different methods of dispute resolution, the dispute will be submitted to arbitration unless the disputing parties
agree otherwise.1 53 If a state alters its chosen method of dispute resolution or if a previous declaration expires while a dispute is pending
before a court or tribunal, the change will not affect
the pending
54
proceedings unless the disputants agree otherwise.1
A court or tribunal chosen by declaration shall have jurisdiction
over any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the
Convention, and over any dispute concerning the interpretation or
application of an international agreement related to the purposes of
the Convention that is submitted to it in accordance with such agreement.1 5 A dispute as to whether a court or tribunal has jurisdiction
shall be settled by that court or tribunal. 56
If a dispute has been duly submitted to a court or tribunal with
jurisdiction, the court or tribunal may prescribe appropriate provisional measures to preserve the respective rights of the parties to the
dispute, pending the final decision. 57 Provisional measures may be
prescribed only at the request of a party to the dispute, and only
after all parties have had an opportunity to be heard.158 Parties to
the dispute and other states, as appropriate, will be given notice of
the provisional measures. 5 9 Pending creation of an arbitral tribunal
to which a dispute will be submitted, any court or tribunal agreed
upon by the disputants may prescribe remedial measures. Failing
such agreement, within two weeks of the request for provisional measures, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (CLOS Tribunal) 60 may prescribe provisional measures if it considers the tribunal being formed to have jurisdiction and if the urgency of the
situation so requires.' The parties to the dispute
must comply
62
promptly with any provisional measures prescribed.
A court or tribunal having jurisdiction under the Convention's
compulsory procedures shall apply the Convention and other rules of
151.
152.
153.

Id. at art. 287(3); see id. at annexes VII, VIII.
Id. at art. 287(4).
Id. at art. 287(5).

154. Id. at art. 287(7).
155. Id. at arts. 288(1), (2); see also id. at annex VI, at final act annex I (concerning the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea).
156. Id. at art. 288(4).

157. Id. at art. 290(1).
158. Id. at art. 290(3).
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. at art.
See id. at
Id. at art.
Id. at art.

290(4).
annex VI, final act annex I.
290(5).
290(6).
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international law not incompatible with the Convention. 163 Any decision rendered by a court or tribunal having jurisdiction under the
Convention's compulsory procedures shall be final and must be complied with by all parties to the dispute."" These decisions have binding force only between the disputants and only in respect to that
particular dispute.' 65
The Convention's dispute settlement procedures 66 are open only
to signatories to the Convention unless the Convention specifies otherwise. 167 The Convention allows nonsignatories to submit their disputes to the CLOS Tribunal if the disputants all agree to confer
jurisdiction on the CLOS Tribunal. 6 In addition, if all parties to a
pre-existing treaty or convention concerning the subject matter of
the Convention agree, any disputes concerning the interpretation or
application of that treaty or convention may be submitted to the
CLOS Tribunal.' 69
PracticalApplication

The Convention is not yet in force, and therefore it cannot be enforced by use of the dispute resolution provisions. 7 ' Once the Convention is in force, states that have ratified the Convention can enforce its provisions against other states that have ratified it by use of
the Convention's dispute resolution provisions. States that have not
ratified the Convention cannot, however, be forced to submit to the

Convention's dispute resolution procedures. (Taiwan did not participate in the Convention. Hence, it is not eligible to sign and ratify the

Convention, and it could not be required to submit to the Convention's dispute resolution procedures. 7 1 )
While the dispute resolution procedures are only applicable to
Convention signatories or by agreement once the Convention is in
force, in all other instances the fisheries provisions and the provisions
concerning enclosed and semi-enclosed seas may still be enforced on
the basis that the Convention is customary international law. 72
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at art. 293.
Id. at art. 296(1).
Id. at art. 296(2).
The procedures are contained in id. at pt. XV (arts. 279-99).
Id. at art. 291.
Id. at annex VI, arts. 20(2), 21.
Id. at annex VI, art. 22.
Id. at art. 308(1); see also supra note 3.
See CLOS, supra note 3, at arts. 287, 291; see also supra note 3.
See supra note 3.

Thus, with respect to all states prior to the Convention entering into
force, and with respect to nonsignatory states, such as Taiwan, subsequent to the Convention entering into force, the United States, the
Soviet Union, and all other concerned states can comply with these
CLOS provisions and can demand both Convention signatories and
nonsignatories comply on the basis that these provisions constitute
customary international law.
The United States and the Soviet Union can also craft multilateral agreements with the fishing states in order to obtain compliance
with conservation schemes.17 3 The United States can enforce a conservation scheme if it provides for it within the Governing International Fisheries Agreement (GIFA) or another treaty negotiated
with the foreign state. 7 4 The Soviet Union can do the same. The two
states can also pursue other remedies under international law, and
they may bestow or suspend benefits such as the opportunity
17 5 to continue to fish in their EEZs, in exchange for compliance.
173. See Sathre, supra note 19, at 751-52 (where the author suggests management
could be by a multilateral agreement among Pacific Rim states); Belsky, supra note 3
(where the author supports a regional approach and management based on the ecosystem); Kindt, supra note 18, at 33-34 (where the author advocates management by either
a global agency or by a regional agency where its members share EEZs); Kawasaki,
supra note 51, at 18-19 (where the author supports management by region); Copes,
Anadromous Fish Stocks, supra note 18, at 245-50 (where the author suggests authorizing an international authority to regulate high seas fisheries, enforce the regulations, and
require states to impose sanctions against violators).
174. See Sathre, supra note 19, at 751. The United States has GIFAs with Japan,
South Korea, the People's Republic of China, and Poland. See Agreement Concerning
Fisheries off the Coasts of the United States, Sept. 10, 1982, United States-Japan, 34

U.S.T. 2059, T.I.A.S. No. 10480 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1983) (as amended Nov. 10,
1987); Agreement Concerning Fisheries Off the Coasts of the United States, July 26,
1982, United States-South Korea, T.I.A.S. No. 10571 (entered into force Apr. 28, 1983)
(as amended May 1987); Agreement Concerning Fisheries Off the Coasts of the United
States, July 23, 1985, United States-the People's Republic of China (entered into force
Nov. 19, 1985); Agreement Concerning Fisheries Off the Coasts of the United States,
Aug. 1, 1985, United States-Poland (entered into force Jan. 1, 1986). The United States
does not have a GIFA with North Korea or Taiwan.
175. In the last few years, the People's Republic of China, Poland, and South Korea have been granted allocations to fish Pacific whiting in the United States EEZ. Poland also has been granted allocations for Atlantic mackerel. Japan has had allocations
in the past, and probably will request allocations once it again becomes eligible. It is not
cuirently eligible for allocations because it has been certified under MFCMA, §
201(e)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2) (1988), for undertaking activities that have diminished the effectiveness of the conservation program of the International Whaling Commission. Japan, the People's Republic of China, Poland, and South Korea also currently
participate in joint ventures in fisheries in the United States EEZ. These privileges could
be made dependent upon cooperation with the United States and the Soviet Union in
devising and enforcing conservation measures for the Central Bering Sea. The United
States can prohibit allocations and authorize embargoes of foreign states whose fishing
operations diminish the effectiveness of an international fishery conservation program.
The Fishermen's Protective Act of 1967 § 8(a), 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a) (1988); MFCMA,
§ 201(e)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2) (1988). Because the goal of the United States is to
completely phase out foreign fishing in its EEZ, it should make nonfishery benefits dependent on cooperation and compliance with conservation programs. The Soviet Union
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Without a treaty providing for enforcement of the conservation

scheme the fishing state could ignore the conservation scheme and
enforcement would be extremely difficult. Enforcement efforts within

the United States EEZ in the Bering sea are impeded by the large
area involved, by the difficulties of proving the harvests of prohibited

species, and by organized efforts by foreign vessels to evade enforce-

ment officers. In the Central Bering Sea, these difficulties would likewise exist, and would be compounded by its greater area. 76 Enforcement is also risky, because the foreign state might perceive
enforcement as an aggressive act. Enforcement methods threatening
or using force cannot be justified under the Convention."'
Acquiescence to enforcement of the conservation scheme is not impossible, however. Pursuant to the Convention Concerning the High
Seas Fisheries of the Northwest Pacific Ocean, 7 8 the Soviet Union
successfully enforces its claim of jurisdiction over salmon and other
stocks in the high seas against Japan. 7 9 The United States and Canada have also had some success with preventing the harvest of
salmon in parts of the Central Bering Sea under the International
North Pacific Fisheries Convention.'8"
should do the same. See Copes, Anadromous Fish Stocks, supra note 18, at 247-50; see
also Kindt, supra note 18, at 21. For an economic analysis of incentives for cooperative
fishery management, see Munro, The Management of Shared Fishery Resources Under
Extended Jurisdiction,3(4) MARINE RESOURCE ECON. 271 (1987).
176. See Sathre, supra note 19, at 751.
177. See CLOS, supra note 3, at arts. 110 (allowing the boarding of commercial
and other nongovernmental foreign ships on the high seas, in the absence of powers derived by treaty, only in limited circumstances, which do not include violation of international conservation regimes), 300 (directing states to fulfill in good faith the obligations
assumed under the CLOS, and to exercise the rights, jurisdiction, and freedoms recognized in the CLOS in a manner that would not constitute an abuse of rights), 301 (ordering states exercising their rights and performing their duties under the CLOS to refrain from any threat or use of force inconsistent with the principles of international law
embodied in the Charter of the United Nations); see also Belsky, supra note 3, at 73536; Copes, UNCLOS III, supra note 3, at 219; Copes, Anadromous Fish Stocks, supra
note 18, at 246.
178. Convention Concerning the High Seas Fisheries of the Northwest Pacific
Ocean, Oct. 19, 1956, Japan-U.S.S.R., 263 U.N.T.S. No. 3738 (entered into force Dec.
12, 1956), reprinted in 2 S. ODA, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE OCEAN DEVELOPMENT 549-53 (1975) [hereinafter Japan-U.S.S.R. Convention].
179. It regulates salmon fisheries in the high seas by prohibiting fishing in some
areas, including the Sea of Okhotsk (which includes high seas pockets) and the North
Pacific west of 160*E. It imposes quotas and time restrictions in other areas. This Convention also regulates the harvest of king crab and herring. See id.; Sathre, supra note

19, at 744-75; Copes, Anadromous Fish Stocks, supra note
note 11, at 176-79.

18, at 237; Tanaka, supra

180. See International North Pacific Fisheries Convention, May 9, 1952, United
States-Canada-Japan, 4 U.S.T. 380, T.I.A.S. No. 2786, (entered into force June 12,

IX.

THE ALTERNATIVE: "CREEPING JURISDICTION" AND
UNDERMINING OF THE CONVENTION

Some have advocated that, regardless of the rule of international
law, the United States and the Soviet Union should bilaterally assume exclusive and absolute control over the Central Bering Sea to
manage the pollock stocks. Such an action would have far-reaching
and dangerous consequences in the world arena.
If the United States and the Soviet Union were to assert exclusive
control over the high seas areas beyond their EEZs, they would
likely generate international criticism and opposition. Because freedom of the high seas has been an accepted theory since the 1600s, 181
their action would likely be perceived as violating the freedom of the
creeping jurisdiction, and as undermining
high seas, as constituting
82
the Convention.1
Assertion of control over any part of the high seas would have
dangerous long-term consequences. In its most narrow application as
precedent, assertion of control over (or exclusion of other states
from) the Central Bering Sea on the basis that it is a semi-enclosed
sea would open the door for other states to assert control over (or
exclude other states from) other enclosed or semi-enclosed seas.183
But once the littoral states have benefited, other states will similarly
want to benefit. This precedent could then be used to allow states to
assert sovereignty over (or exclude other states from) other areas of

the high seas for fishery management purposes. Assertion of rights
over straddling and associated stocks in the high seas area would
have the same effect.
Fishery restrictions could serve as a precedent for other restrictions. For example, the Soviet Union has long advocated a special
rule to allow coastal states to exclude from enclosed and semi-en1953), as amended Nov. 17, 1962 (14 U.S.T. 953, T.I.A.S. No. 5385), Apr. 25, 1978 (30
U.S.T. 1095, T.I.A.S. No. 9242), June 5, 1984 and May 23, 1986 [hereinafter INPFC];
see also Copes, Anadromous Fish Stocks, supra note 18, at 237. For a history of the
INPFC, see Sathre, supra note 19, at 735-45. Under the INPFC, The Japanese mothership fishery has been excluded from fishing salmon north of 56"N Latitude and east of
180" Longitude. This fishery will be phased out of the Central Bering Sea by 1994 in the
area north of 56"N latitude and west of 180' longitude, and it will be limited elsewhere
in the Bering Sea. The land-based fishery is limited to an area south of 48 'N Latitude.
See INPFC, supra, amended annex (May 23, 1986); see also Sathre, supra note 19, at
743.
181.

See Peirce, Selective Adoption of the New Law of the Sea: The United States

Proclaims its Exclusive Economic Zone, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 581, 584 (1983); D.LARSON,
supra note 136, at 192-95.
182. See D. LARSON, supra note 136, at 201-02; Knauss, supra note 3, at 209.
183. There are a number of enclosed and semi-enclosed seas, but only a few include significant pockets of high seas. Of these, all remain open except the Sea of
Okhotsk, which the Soviet Union is attempting to close. See D. LARSON, supra note 136,
at 203-06; Alexander, Regionalism, supra note 136, at 158.
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closed seas all warships of other states."" In addition, others have
advocated such restrictions as pollution regulation, exclusion of warships and tankers, and exclusion of scientific research projects. 185
These restrictions and exclusions would be contrary to the Conven-

tion.1 86 There is a very real danger, however, that states could assert
exclusive control over areas of high seas for these purposes on the
same basis that control is asserted over fisheries. Littoral states

might close off enclosed and semi-enclosed seas to nonlittoral ships
on the basis of protecting the marine environment and could pre-

clude marine scientific research. Coastal states might similarly exclude nonlittoral ships from their EEZs. Thus, the exclusive assertion

of fishery management control over the Central Bering Sea by the

United States and the Soviet Union is only one step away from exclusive control by littoral states and coastal states for all purposes in
enclosed and semi-enclosed seas, EEZs, and possibly other areas of
high seas.

The likelihood of this result can be seen from the origin of the
EEZ. Prior to recognition of the EEZ, international law recognized
only the territorial sea. In 1945, President Truman proclaimed that
the United States was unilaterally asserting jurisdiction over the re184. See Darby, The Soviet Doctrine of the Closed Sea, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
685, 690 (1986); Alexander, Special Circumstances: Semienclosed Seas, supra note 136,
at 201-15.
185. When writing prior to the Convention Conference, Mr. Alexander believed
that littoral states should regulate pollution by creating pollution control zones, preventing potential polluters from entering, and by imposing higher pollution control standards
than the international norm. Mr. Alexander also thought that littoral states should restrict freedom of navigation by excluding from enclosed and semi-enclosed seas all military vessels, or at least the military vessels of nonlittoral states. Also, where the route is
hazardous, he thought the littoral states should monitor and restrict passage based on
weather conditions and conditions of the vessel and crew. Mr. Alexander also believed
that restrictions should be placed on freedom of scientific research by nonlittoral states
on the grounds that the sea is perceived to be within the domain of the surrounding
nations. Alexander, Special Circumstances:Semienclosed Seas, supra note 136, at 20115.
186. The Convention allows regulation of pollution and imposition of standards but
recognizes that all states have duties to cooperate with other states in devising measures
for protection and preservation of the marine environment from pollution. See CLOS,
supra note 3, at art. 123(b); id. at pt. XII (arts. 192-237).
The Convention also explicitly guarantees the rights of states to navigate on both the
high seas and in the EEZ. See id. at arts. 58, 87. The Convention explicitly guarantees
the rights of states to conduct marine scientific research on the high seas and in the
EEZs, with some limitations. See id. at arts. 87, 238, 245, 246. Even in EEZS, though
the Convention requires states doing scientific research to obtain the consent of the
coastal state, the Convention allows the withholding of consent only in limited circumstances. See id. at art. 246.

sources of the continental shelf and waters contiguous to its coast.'87
Subsequently, many other states began asserting jurisdiction over extended resource zones.' 8 By the time of the Third Conference on the
Law of the Sea, the idea of an EEZ was accepted. One of the principal objectives of the Law of the Sea Conference was to stop the unilateral "creeping jurisdiction" of the coastal states."8 9 Thus, ignoring
the Convention to assert rights over the high seas constitutes "creeping jurisdiction" and would undermine the Convention. It could also
result in the carving up of all the seas, loss of the freedom of the
high seas, and return to the mare clausum (closed sea) of the pre1600s.
X.

SUMMARY

Under the Convention, the United States and the Soviet Union
can rely on a number of different theories to conserve and manage
the different stocks of fish in the Central Bering Sea.
Under CLOS Articles 116(c) through 120190 and the conservation
on the high seas theory, the Convention recognizes: (1) all states' interests in the stocks of the high seas, (2) limits on freedom of fishing
in the high seas for conservation purposes, and (3) states' duties to
independently and jointly devise conservation measures for the fish
stocks in the high seas. The United States and the Soviet Union
would have to work with the other states harvesting pollock and
other stocks in the Central Bering Sea to reach a multilateral conservation agreement. They could establish a regional organization for
that purpose. The two states could rely upon the Convention to demand that other states negotiate in good faith toward the establishment of conservation measures. If some or all of the fishing states
refuse to negotiate, the cooperating states could develop a conservation scheme along Article 119 guidelines and announce its implementation. Those violating the scheme would be in violation of the
Convention (once the Convention enters into force) and customary
international law.
Under the straddling and associated stocks theory and under
CLOS Articles 56, 61, 87, and 116(b), the Convention recognizes
that fishing states' freedom to fish on the high seas is subject to the
187. See Proclamation No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. 67 (1943-48); Proclamation No. 2667,
3 C.F.R. 68 (1943-48); see also Belsky, supra note 3, at 745-46; Kindt, supra note 18, at
25.
188. See R. CHURCHILL & A. LowE, supra note 6, at 200-01; 1 D. O'CONNELL,
supra note 17, at 553-58; Kindt, supra note 18, at 25-26; Copes, Anadromous Fish
Stocks, supra note 18, at 234-35; see also Knauss, supra note 182.
189. See Peirce, supra note 181, at 582-83; 1 D. O'CONNELL, supra note 17, at
552-81.
190. CLOS Article 87 could be relied upon as well. See CLOS supra note 3, at
art. 87; see also supra Sections II, III.
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rights, duties, and interests of the coastal state. This means that fishing states have duties to avoid compromising a coastal state's rights
over, and duties to conserve, stocks within the coastal state's EEZ.
Under Articles 63(2), 87, and 116(b), the Convention acknowledges
the special interest of the coastal state in its straddling and associated stocks in the high seas. The Convention recognizes the duties
imposed upon both the coastal state and the fishing states to seek
agreement concerning conservation of the stocks.
Because the pollock stocks in the Bering Sea are believed to be
one complex or interdependent stock, the United States and the Soviet Union could rely on the Convention to demand that states modify their pollock fisheries in the Central Bering Sea to stop negative
impacts in their EEZs. The two states could also demand that fishing
states negotiate concerning conservation of the straddling and associated stocks. Management of the pollock stocks would require the
United States and the Soviet Union to seek a management regime
established by multilateral agreement among all states fishing the
stocks. The United States and the Soviet Union could not bilaterally
devise a conservation scheme under this theory unless the states fishing the pollock refused to negotiate in good faith. Even then, the
fishing states could not be forced to comply with the conservation
regime devised. However, those refusing to modify their fisheries to
stop negative impacts on stocks within the EEZs of the United
States and the Soviet Union, and those refusing to negotiate a con-

servation scheme in good faith, would be in violation of the Convention (once in force) and customary international law.
Under CLOS Articles 66, 87, and 116(b) and the anadromous
stocks theory, the Convention recognizes there is no freedom to fish
anadromous stocks on the high seas, except where it would result in
economic dislocation. The Convention also recognizes that the state
of origin has a special interest, approaching a right, in its anadromous stocks. The state of origin and the states allowed to harvest the
stocks on the high seas have duties to conserve the stocks. The state
of origin has a duty to consult with the fishing states and states
whose EEZs the stocks pass through, consider their interests, and
devise conservation measures that minimize economic dislocation.
States harvesting the stocks have a duty to provide advice on, and
comply with, the measures established by the state of origin.
The United States and the Soviet Union can unilaterally or bilaterally, with some limitations, exercise control over the anadromous
stocks that originate from their respective internal waters. The two

states can demand that all states refrain from fishing for anadromous stocks in the Central Bering Sea unless the states can show
that they fished the stocks in that particular area of the high seas
prior to the signing of the Convention and that economic dislocation
would result if they stopped fishing. The United States and the Soviet Union are responsible for the regulation of their anadromous
stocks in the Central Bering Sea. They can establish catch limits and
impose terms and conditions for those states allowed to harvest the
stocks, though they must allow input from them and from states
whose EEZs the stocks pass through, and must cooperate in minimizing economic dislocation of the states allowed to harvest the fish.
Regulations could include phase-out of directed harvests and phasein of fishing gear restrictions to minimize or eliminate the incidental
catch of anadromous stocks. Those states continuing to harvest the
anadromous stocks of the United States or the Soviet Union in the
Central Bering Sea that do not qualify for the exception would be in
violation of the Convention (once in force) and customary international law. The same would be true of states permitted to directly or
incidentally harvest anadromous stocks, if the states failed to comply
with conservation regulations devised by the United States, the Soviet Union, or both.
Under CLOS Articles 67, 87, and 116(b) and the catadromous
species theory, the Convention recognizes that there is no freedom to
fish for catadromous species on the high seas. The state in whose
waters catadromous species spend the greater part of their life cycle
has a special interest, which approaches a right, in its catadromous
species. This state also has a duty to conserve the species, and states
fishing on the high seas have a duty to refrain from harvesting them.
It is unknown whether any catadromous species migrate into the
Central Bering Sea and whether they are being harvested there. If
catadromous species from the United States or the Soviet Union are
present there and are being harvested, these states may, unilaterally
or bilaterally, demand that the harvesting stop. Those states harvesting catadromous species of the United States or the Soviet Union in
the Central Bering Sea would be in violation of the Convention
(once in force) and customary international law.
Under CLOS Articles 76, 77, 87, and 116(b) and the sedentary
species theory, the Convention recognizes that there is no freedom to
fish sedentary species of the seabed and subsoil of the continental
shelf. The Convention specifically recognizes the coastal state's sole
right to these species, and fishing states have a duty to refrain from
harvesting them. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have
determined their portions of the continental shelf to extend to the
United States-Russian Convention Line of 1867, which passes
through the Central Bering Sea. If other states are found to be har-
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vesting the sedentary species of the Central Bering Sea, the two
states may unilaterally or bilaterally compel them to stop. Under

this theory, no jurisdiction can be asserted over finfish in the Central
Bering Sea unless it could be shown that a finfish fishery had a significant incidental catch of sedentary species or was conducted in
such a way as to damage the sedentary species. Those harvesting
sedentary species of the United States or the Soviet Union would be
in violation of the Convention (once in force) and customary international law.
CLOS Article 123, in conjunction with Articles 87 and 116(b)
and the enclosed and semi-enclosed seas theory, recognizes that littoral states have a special interest in the stocks of the enclosed and
semi-enclosed seas they border. The freedom of fishing in high seas
pockets within enclosed and semi-enclosed seas is subject to that interest. Nonlittoral fishing states and littoral states have a special
duty to cooperate in performing duties incorporated from other provisions of the Convention to conserve the living resources there. The
United States and the Soviet Union could forge a multilateral conservation regime with the nonlittoral states fishing in the Central
Bering Sea. If nonlittoral fishing states refuse to cooperate, the
United States and the Soviet Union, together with any other cooperating state, could carry out their duties to conserve the stocks by
devising a conservation scheme along Article 119 guidelines. Those
violating a multilaterally-imposed management regime would be in
violation of the Convention (once in force) and customary international law.
Once the Convention is in force, the United States and the Soviet
Union may compel those in violation of the Convention under any of
these theories to comply by use of the Convention's dispute resolution procedures, as-long as all concerned are signatories to the Convention. Alternatively, the two states may compel other states to
comply by use of treaties, as well as bestowal or suspension of benefits, with the offending states.

XI. CONCLUSION
The Convention contains a number of provisions concerning fisheries and enclosed and semi-enclosed seas. These provisions recognize
the freedoms, rights, duties, and interests of all states, whether they
are coastal states or states fishing in the high seas. Together, these
provisions represent the delicate balance of all states' interests. The
Convention recognizes that freedoms and rights are countered by du-

ties and interests. A state can no longer assert its freedoms or rights
without honoring other states' freedoms, rights, and legitimate interests and without fulfilling its own obligations. No longer are freedoms and rights absolute. No longer can freedoms and rights be exercised irresponsibly.
The Convention recognizes that states must cooperate with each
other in accommodating their various freedoms, rights, and interests,
and in determining and fulfilling their obligations. A constant theme
throughout the Convention is that where these freedoms, rights, duties, and interests interface, the states must act together to determine the limits and effects of each. No state can, within the bounds
of the Convention, refuse to cooperate in good faith in devising conservation regimes with other states. Likewise, no state can refuse,
within the bounds of the Convention, to cooperate with other states
to ensure compliance with conservation regimes determined pursuant
to the Convention.
Once the Convention enters into force, it will provide a peaceful
means to resolve disputes that arise concerning the interface of
states' freedoms, rights, duties, and interests. It will ensure states
will cooperate with other states, when compelled to cooperate by the
terms of the Convention. It will ensure states will act, when compelled to act by the terms of the Convention. It will ensure states will
refrain from acting, when compelled to refrain by the terms of the
Convention.
The Convention provisions also should be treated as customary international law to prevent overharvest and depletion of stocks in the
Central Bering Sea. The United States and the Soviet Union must
recognize their duty to conserve the stocks, and must assert their
rights and interests. They must demand that fishing states honor
these rights and interests. Fishing states must subject their freedom
of fishing in the high seas area to their duty to conserve the stocks
and comply with these demands.
The problems of overfishing in the Central Bering Sea and in all
other high seas areas can be solved by using the provisions of the
Convention, whether as customary international law or as a treaty.
By giving the Convention the respect of law, the rule of law will be
peacefully perpetuated in the international context of fisheries conservation and management. Then, the best interests of all states will
be served in the long term, and the fisheries of the Central Bering
Sea and our other high seas areas will not be squandered and will
not reflect the tragedy of the commons.

